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Taking Stock of the Global Fight 
Against Digital Repression, 
Disinformation, and Election 
Insecurity 
 
Scott J. Shackelford JD, Ph.D.* 
Angie Raymond, JD** 
Abbey Stemler, JD, MBA*** 
Cyanne Loyle, Ph.D.**** 
Abstract 
Amidst the regular drumbeat of reports about Russian 
attempts to undermine U.S. democratic institutions from Twitter 
bots to cyber-attacks on Congressional candidates, it is easy to 
forget that the problem of election security is not isolated to the 
United States and extends far beyond safeguarding insecure 
voting machines. Consider Australia, which has long been 
grappling with repeated Chinese attempts to interfere with its 
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political system. Yet Australia has taken a distinct approach in 
how it has sought to protect its democratic institutions, including 
reclassifying its political parties as “critical infrastructure,” a 
step that the U.S. government has yet to take despite repeated 
breaches at both the Democratic and Republican National 
Committees.  
This Article analyzes the Australian approach to protecting 
its democratic institutions from Chinese influence operations 
and compares it to the U.S. response to Russian efforts. It then 
moves on to discuss how other cyber powers, including the 
European Union, have taken on the fight against digital 
repression and disinformation, and then compares these 
practices to the particular vulnerabilities of Small Pacific Island 
Nations. Such a comparative study is vital to help build 
resilience, and trust, in democratic systems on both sides of the 
Pacific. We argue that a multifaceted approach is needed to build 
more resilient and sustainable democratic systems. This should 
encompass both targeted reforms focusing on election 
infrastructure security—such as requiring paper ballots and 
risk-limiting audits—with deeper structural interventions to 
limit the spread of misinformation and combat digital 
repression.  
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I.  Introduction 
Democracy has never been and never can be so durable as 
Aristocracy or Monarchy. But while it lasts it is more bloody 
than either . . . Remember, democracy never lasts long. It 
soon wastes exhausts and murders itself. There never was a 
Democracy Yet, that did not commit suicide. 
U.S. President John Adams1 
 
Since the U.S. was founded, detractors and critics have 
heralded its ultimate downfall.2 Benjamin Franklin once 
famously quipped after being asked what sort of government the 
Founders had gifted the new nation: “A republic, if you can keep 
it.”3 For the more than 230 years since that time, many of the 
threats to American democracy, as with other emerging and 
advanced democracies around the world, have stemmed from 
 
 1. Letter from John Adams to John Taylor (Dec. 17, 1814), 
http://perma.cc/724R-ESVB.  
 2. See, e.g., Richard R. Beeman, Perspectives on the Constitution: A 
Republic, If You Can Keep It, NAT’L. CONST. CTR., https://perma.cc/J36F-2EAP 
(presenting the initial, objectionable reactions of the Founding Fathers when 
they were presented with the United States Constitution). 
 3. Id. 
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internal divisions fed by inequality, injustice, and racism; 
fissures that have from time to time purposefully been widened 
and deepened by foreign nations wishing to distract and 
destabilize the U.S. government.4  
Recently, Russia has been particularly active, by one 
estimate interfering in twenty-seven elections since 1991, 
beginning with the nations of Eastern Europe that had been 
former members of the Cold War-era Warsaw Pact.5 Such efforts 
have been extended since 2014 to Western Europe and the 
United States, reaching a culmination in their interference with 
the 2016 Brexit vote and U.S. Presidential election, made easier 
by the rise of internet platforms generally and social networking 
in particular.6 Such efforts continued into the 2018 U.S. 
midterm elections, when U.S. Cyber Command shut down a 
Russian troll farm on Election Day.7  
Furthermore, today’s threats to democratic institutions in 
the United States and abroad are acute, extending from the 
protection of voting machines and media sites to related issues 
of critical infrastructure, 5G, and even Internet of Things (IoT) 
vulnerabilities.8 Keeping the Republic for the next century, 
then, requires a range of policy responses from reigning in the 
worst excesses of internet platforms to securing the voting 
process itself to safeguarding democratic institutions from being 
 
 4. See, e.g., Josh Zeitz, Foreign Governments Have Been Tampering with 
U.S. Elections for Decades, POLITICO (July 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/CAQ8-
UW5A (noting multiple occasions of foreign interference with American 
presidential elections).  
 5. See Luncan Ahmad Way & Adam Casey, Russia Has Been Meddling 
in Foreign Elections for Decades. Has it Made a Difference?, WASH. POST (Jan. 
8, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/2BC8-J9MK (examining the two waves of 
Russian interference with United States presidential elections since the early 
1990s).  
 6. See id. (noting that since 2014, Russia has used the internet to spread 
disinformation campaigns, create fake Facebook profiles, leak emails and fake 
documents to WikiLeaks, and engage in cyberattacks and phishing attacks).  
 7. See Jacqueline Thomsen, US Cyber Operation Blocked Internet for 
Russian Troll Farm on Election Day 2018: Report, HILL (Feb. 26, 2019, 12:32 
PM), https://perma.cc/MB9T-SWX6 (discussing the ability of the United States 
Cyber Command to block Russian interference in the 2018 midterm elections).   
 8. See Scott J. Shackelford et al., Making Democracy Harder to Hack, 50 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 629, 630–33 (2017) (highlighting cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities in the United States’ national and state electoral systems). 
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undermined by both foreign and domestic efforts, offline and 
online.9 Luckily, much as U.S. states are often seen as 
laboratories for democracy, this debate does not exist in a 
vacuum.10 U.S. policymakers can and should learn from what 
has worked elsewhere in our common quest to make democracy 
“harder to hack.”11 
Indeed, amidst the regular drumbeat of reports about 
Russian attempts to undermine U.S. democratic institutions 
from Twitter bots to cyber-attacks on congressional candidates, 
it is easy to forget that the problem of election security is not 
isolated to the United States and extends far beyond 
safeguarding insecure voting machines.12 Consider Australia, 
which has long been grappling with repeated Chinese attempts 
to interfere with its political system. One 2018 report found that 
the Chinese have infiltrated “every layer of Australian 
Government, right down to local councils.”13 Yet Australia has 
taken a distinct approach in how it has sought to protect its 
democratic institutions, including reclassifying its political 
parties as “critical infrastructure,” a step that the U.S. 
government has yet to take despite repeated breaches at both 
the Democratic and Republican National Committees.14  
This Article details the Australian approach to protecting 
its democratic institutions from Chinese influence operations 
and compares it to the U.S. response to Russian meddling 
efforts. Such a comparative study is vital to help build 
resilience, and trust, in democratic systems on both sides of the 
 
 9. See id. (evaluating the policy debate surrounding the designation of 
the United States electoral system as a critical infrastructure).  
 10. See id. (detailing instances of election tampering, both internationally 
and in the United States). 
 11. See generally id.  
 12. See Michael Wines & Julian E. Barnes, How the U.S. Is Fighting 
Russian Election Interference, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/B7LH-D57T (stating that the most pervasive Russian threats 
are those concerning social media).  
 13. Stephanie Borys, China’s ‘Brazen’ and ‘Aggressive’ Political 
Interference Outlined in Top-Secret Report, ABC NEWS (May 29, 2018, 5:28 
PM), https://perma.cc/D27J-JGDQ. 
 14. See 2016 Presidential Campaign Hacking Fast Facts, CNN (Oct. 31, 
2019, 1:10 PM), https://perma.cc/VUR3-ZJAD (offering a timeline for the 
investigations and conclusions about the 2016 election hacking efforts).  
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Pacific. But we do not stop there. For the first time in the 
literature that we could identify, we also analyze the efforts of 
other leading cyber powers—including the European 
Union— comparing them against not only the United States and 
Australia, but also Small Pacific Island Nations, to better 
understand how to deter misinformation and disinformation 
campaigns in 2020 and beyond.15  
In all, we argue that democracies can and should work 
together to share both cyber threat information and best 
practices to build resilience in democratic institutions the world 
over, and that a multi-faceted approach is needed that combines 
both targeted reforms to secure election infrastructure—such as 
requiring paper ballots and risk-limiting audits—with deeper 
structural interventions to limit the spread of misinformation 
and combat “digital repression.”16 We assert that it is vital to 
take this wider view of defending democracy that includes not 
only a focus on protecting election infrastructure, but also 
digital repression—both are means to an end, undermining 
trust, and confidence, in democratic institutions. As such, 
defending democracy in 2020 and beyond requires 
implementing policy responses that tackle this full range of 
cyber-enabled threats, which are not limited to insecure voting 
machines and processes.17   
The Article is structured as follows. Part II offers a short 
history of the cyber threat facing democracies, focusing on the 
 
 15. See Australia Increases Investment in South Pacific Islands in an 
Apparent Response to China’s Growing Economic Influence in the Region, 
RWR ADVISORY GRP. (July 13, 2018, 11:52 AM), https://perma.cc/AR8W-5Q7G 
(recounting the Australian government’s MoU with the Solomon Islands and 
Papua New Guinea to address China’s growing economic activity in the areas).  
 16. See Brandon Valeriano, Welcome to the Age of Digital Repression, 
QUARTZ (Jan. 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/W9A9-HRTN (deeming cyber 
repression as one of the digital age’s most important challenges and revealing 
that Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton previously called for shutting down 
the internet).  
 17. Further, it is important to note that prevalent cyber insecurity can 
feed digital repression; indeed, oftentimes new regulations from autocratic 
nations that are designed to address cybersecurity issues often wind up 
further entrenching repression. See Adrian Shahbaz, Fake News, Data 
Collection, and the Challenge to Democracy, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
https://perma.cc/Z3UB-386H (referencing the growing censorship of the 
internet leading to the disruption of democracies). 
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role of authoritarian regimes in furthering digital repression. 
Part III summarizes U.S. efforts to protect election 
infrastructure post-2016. Part IV features a comparative case 
study summarizing EU efforts to similarly safeguard their 
democratic societies as compared to efforts from Australia and 
Oceania. Finally, Part V crystallizes implications and suggests 
policy responses to better manage both threats to election 
infrastructure and digital repression.  
II.  Unpacking the Cyber Threat to Democracies 
Threats to democracy, both foreign and domestic, take a 
variety of forms, which is part of the challenge in coming up with 
coherent policy responses.18 For example, depending on the 
scale and preferred lens, it is possible to view post-2016 efforts 
to secure democracies as an exercise in regulating social media 
firms to guard against both misinformation and 
disinformation,19 protecting vulnerable critical infrastructure,20 
or even as one facet of a larger needed debate on governing the 
Internet of Things,21 to name a few. This Part helps to frame out 
this broader discussion by providing a short history of 
cyber-enabled election interference and how authoritarian 
 
 18. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 26–28 (2017), https://perma.cc/SGG4-9TLH (PDF) 
(explaining that, due to the patient and strategic combination of political, 
economic, military, and informational strategies employed against the United 
States, responding to threats such as those related to cyber security, are more 
challenging).  
 19. Disinformation is commonly understood as false information that is 
spread deliberately with the goal of deceiving a targeted population, while 
misinformation may or may not be intentional, but is inaccurate. See 
Propaganda vs. Misinformation, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. SHERIDAN LIBRS., 
https://perma.cc/E2QW-G74W (last updated June 20, 2020, 4:28 PM) 
(comparing propaganda, information, misinformation, and disinformation). 
 20. See Scott J. Shackelford, Opinion, How to Make Democracy Harder to 
Hack, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/S6M6-EDFU 
(listing the items that are considered critical infrastructure).   
 21. See Scott J. Shackelford, When Toasters Attack: Enhancing the 
‘Security of Things’ Through Polycentric Governance, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 415, 
418 (considering the protection measures needed for cybersecurity resulting 
from the Internet of Things).  
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regimes use digital repression both at home and abroad to help 
shape political debates. 
A.  Understanding Election Insecurity 
In general, election security is discussed in two 
interconnected yet separate areas of research.22 The first 
involves election infrastructure security and is focused on the 
security of the system itself, such as voting machines and 
tabulation systems.23 The second is the fight against digital 
repression, including misinformation disseminated by social 
media.24 Both areas are essential to the overall goal of defending 
democracy, and one cannot be successful without the other.25  
Hacking into voting machines remains far too easy.26 The 
vulnerabilities are not just theoretical.27 They have been 
exploited around the world, such as in South Africa, Ukraine, 
Bulgaria and the Philippines.28 In 2014, for example, 
 
 22. See THE NAT’L. ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G., & MED., SECURING THE VOTE: 
PROTECTING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, xi–xiii (2018) (ebook) [hereinafter 
SECURING THE VOTE] (explaining that while the authors thought that their 
attentions would be devoted to the threats posed by long polling lines and 
outdated election systems, they also had to focus on the threats emerging from 
social media and other digital media). 
 23. See LAWRENCE NORDEN & CHRISTOPHER FAMIGHETTI, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUST., AMERICA’S VOTING MACHINES AT RISK 8–15 (2015), 
https://perma.cc/5ZP7-JDV2 (PDF) (discussing the need to replace and 
upgrade aging voting systems and address insecure tabulation systems to 
protect election security). 
 24. See Shahbaz, supra note 17 (discussing the connection between 
digital censorship and repression). 
 25. See SECURING THE VOTE, supra note 22, at 4 (articulating the threats 
of both election infrastructure and digital media on election security). 
 26. See Shackelford, supra note 20 (detailing the ability of researchers 
from the University of Michigan to hack into government webpages in 2012 to 
have the University’s fight song play after votes were casted). 
 27. See id. (providing concrete examples of hacking incidents on voting 
machines and databases in South Africa and the United States). 
 28. See John Leyden, Hacker Almost Derailed Mandela Election in South 
Africa, REGISTER (Oct. 27, 2010), https://perma.cc/LW3L-MJKX (detailing the 
ability of an unidentified hacker to almost successfully derail the democratic 
elections in South Africa); Daniel Funke & Daniela Flamini, A Guide to 
Anti-Misinformation Actions Around the World, POYNTER (Sept. 8, 2020), 
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Russian-backed hackers targeted Ukraine by attempting to fake 
vote totals for its presidential election.29 They were caught just 
in time, but the sophistication of the attacks should have been 
seen as “a warning shot for future elections in the US and 
abroad.”30 Unfortunately, the U.S. government did not take the 
warning as seriously as it should have, as is discussed in Part 
III. But it should be noted that successful attacks do not need 
the resources and expertise of national governments—even kids 
have managed to orchestrate them.31 
Election security suffers from common threats, as are 
summarized in Table 1, that range from outdated voting 
machines to insecure tabulation systems, each of which requires 
a different policy response as is discussed in Part V. This 
non-comprehensive list underscores the extent to which cyber 
insecurity enables digital repression, and vice versa, such as 
when hackers target vulnerabilities in government IT systems 
to spread misinformation about an upcoming election 




https://perma.cc/2MPG-DWP9 (last updated Aug. 13, 2020) (referencing 
reports conducted by the EU to address the growing concern about 
misinformation and summarizing the responses of different countries to the 
spread of online misinformation). 
 29. See Mark Clayton, Ukraine Election Narrowly Avoided ‘Wanton 
Destruction’ from Hackers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 17, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/23H9-AGZ6 (discussing the three-pronged cyber-attack on 
Ukraine’s presidential election). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Alex Hern, Kids at Hacking Conference Show How Easily US 
Elections Could be Sabotaged, GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/TBM2-VD87 (highlighting a child’s ability to hack into 
websites, including those used for voter registration and campaigning efforts 
and the significant potential that creates for undermining election security). 
 32. See, e.g., Seven Ways Misinformation Spread During the 2016 
Election, KNIGHT FOUND. (Oct. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/ZBR5-633R 
(providing a list of the many ways that misinformation was conveyed during 
the 2016 election). 
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Table 1: Non-Comprehensive List of Election 
Security Threats33 





• Tampering with 
registrations 
• Denial-of-service (DoS) 
attacks or overload of 
party/campaign 
registration causing them 
to miss the deadline 





• Identity fraud during 
voter registration 
• Deleting or tampering 
with voter data 
• DoS or overload of voter 
registration system 
suppressing voters 
Campaign Campaign IT 
• Hacking candidate 
laptops or email accounts 
• Hacking campaign 
websites (defacement, 
DoS) 
• Misconfiguration of a 
website 






of government servers 
 
 33. NIS COOP. GRP., COMPENDIUM ON CYBER SECURITY OF ELECTION 
TECHNOLOGY 16 (2018), [hereinafter COMPENDIUM] https://perma.cc/BMG4-
C8WS (PDF). 
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• Communication networks, 
or endpoints 
• Hacking government 
websites, spreading 










• Tampering or DoS of 
voting and/or vote 
confidentiality during or 
after the elections 
• Software bug altering 
election results 
• Tampering with 
logs/journals 
• Breach of voter privacy 
during the casting of 
votes 
• Tampering, DoS, or 
overload of the systems 
used for counting or 
aggregating results 
• Tampering or DoS of 
communication links used 
to transfer (interim) 
results 
• Tampering with supply 
chain involved in the 
movement or transfer of 
data 
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• Hacking of internal 
systems used by media or 
press 
• Tampering, DoS, or 
overload of media 
communication links 
• Defacement, DoS, or 
overload of websites or 
other systems used for 
publication of the results 
 
Table 1 serves as a framework for exploring the complex 
issue of democracy insecurity; however, no single issue should 
be focused on in isolation as each forms a complex backbone of 
the overall needs of the democratic system.34 This Article 
focuses specifically upon the dual, related issues of securing 
election infrastructure and digital repression.35 Yet, as is clear, 
these threats only constitute a small fraction of the larger 
conversation about maintaining the integrity of democratic 
systems.36 As such, this Article attempts to break down these 
areas into discrete conversations, without losing sight of the 
larger context in which the system is placed.  
B.  A Brief History of Cyber-Enabled Election Interference 
Foreign electoral interference is nothing new.37 One study 
found that from 1945 to 2000, the United States and Russia 
combined tried to influence foreign elections 117 times, using 
 
 34. See SECURING THE VOTE, supra note 22, at 4 (discussing the impacts 
of election infrastructure and digital media). 
 35. See id. (exploring the relationship between election infrastructure 
and digital repression). 
 36. See COMPENDIUM, supra note 33, at 16 (providing a list of election 
security threats). 
 37. See Don H. Levin, When the Great Power Gets a Vote: The Effects of 
Great Power Electoral Interventions on Election Results, 60 INT’L. STUD. Q. 189, 
189 (2016) (discussing electoral interventions). 
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both overt and covert methods.38 It is not even a novelty to use 
cyber-attacks to influence the outcome of an election. As far back 
as 1994, Nelson Mandela’s presidential victory in South Africa 
was initially diluted due to an illicit computer program.39 
Russia, in particular, has been developing its disinformation 
capabilities for decades, long before the first packet of 
information was sent on a fiber optic cable.40 Pre-Soviet Union, 
the Tsarist secret police (the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy 
Bezopasnosti (KGB), now Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti 
(FSB), which is the predecessor Federal Security Service) used 
disinformation.41 Joseph Stalin created an independent agency 
for dezinformatsiya designed to undermine political opponents 
and mislead Soviet citizens and foreigners alike as to the 
USSR’s intentions.42 During the Cold War, for example, Russian 
agents helped plant “hundreds of bogus headlines around the 
world” such as the claim that the U.S. government created the 
autoimmune disease AIDS, a false claim that was first 
mentioned in an Indian newspaper in the 1980s after being 
planted by a KGB agent.43 That story eventually circled the 
world, and was even mentioned by a famous American 
newsperson, Dan Rather, on the CBS Evening News in 1987.44  
Effective disinformation campaigns typically have three 
components: (1) a state-sponsored news outlet to originate the 
fabrication; (2) alternative media sources willing to spread it 
without adequately checking the underlying facts; and (3) 
witting or unwitting “agents of influence” (e.g., accomplices or 
 
 38. Id.  
 39. See Aislinn Laing, Election Won by Mandela ‘Rigged by Opposition,’ 
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 24, 2010, 6:47 PM), https://perma.cc/C63L-VW5K (stating 
that a hacker rigged the election). Unfortunately, the hacker who installed 
this program was never identified. Id. For more on this topic, see Shackelford 
et al., supra note 8, at 629.  
 40. See Ben Popken, Factory of Lies: Russia’s Disinformation Playbook 
Exposed, NBC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2018, 8:02 PM), https://perma.cc/H974-GPDY 
(noting Russia’s early efforts to spread disinformation during the Cold War 
through inaccurate newspaper headlines). 
 41. See id. (dating Russia’s use of disinformation back to the 1880s when 
it was utilized by the Tsarist secret police). 
 42. See id.  
 43. See id (describing the worldwide spread).  
 44. Id. 
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unknowing agents) to advance the story in other outlets.45 The 
advent of cyberspace has put the disinformation process into 
overdrive, both speeding the viral spread of stories across 
national boundaries and platforms with ease, and causing a 
proliferation in the types of traditional and social media willing 
to run with fake stories.46 One tragic example is a false story 
about adopted children being butchered for their organs and 
sold to wealthy U.S. citizens that first appeared in Honduras in 
1986, which was quickly debunked with the official whom was 
quoted denying the episode and issuing a correction, but that 
did not stop Soviet newspapers from spreading it around the 
world.47 But this is just one tool among many.48 Nations such as 
China and Russia also inundate internet discussion forums with 
so-called “flooding attacks” that enable distraction and 
disinformation.49 As Henry Farrell and Bruce Schneier write: 
“Libertarians often argue that the best antidote to bad speech is 
more speech. What Vladimir Putin discovered was that the best 
antidote to more speech was bad speech.”50 
Such actions are not confined to the physical or digital 
borders of illiberal regimes.51 Russia has been linked with 
“confidence attacks” aimed at destabilizing democracies 
(especially those in bordering countries, such as Ukraine) and 
 
 45. See id. (detailing a successful disinformation campaign). 
 46. See, e.g., Davey Alba & Adam Satariano, At Least 70 Countries Have 
Had Disinformation Campaigns, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/TGZ4-93FS (demonstrating that at least seventy countries 
have suffered from political disinformation campaigns despite overwhelming 
efforts by programs designed to stop them). 
 47. See Popken, supra note 40 (explaining the promulgation of false 
headlines by Russian and Soviet agents during the Cold War). 
 48. See Henry Farrell & Bruce Schneier, The Most Damaging Election 
Disinformation Campaign Came from Donald Trump, Not Russia, VICE (Nov. 
19, 2018, 10:26 AM), https://perma.cc/5GYL-KE4S (articulating the many 
methods of undermining election security, including the spread of false 
information, flooding attacks, confidence attacks, and Donald Trump’s own 
comments about fraudulent election results). 
 49. See id. (discussing flooding attacks and their effect on democracy). 
 50. Id.  
 51. See id. (stating that the United States felt like the internet could 
positively spread liberal, American values).  
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undermining trust in elections,52 a practice that, as we have 
seen, dates back centuries but now makes use of modern 
technologies along with the implicit trust and openness in 
democratic societies. Russia, of course, is not alone in such 
efforts.53 As will be discussed further, China is increasingly 
emulating Russian disinformation efforts, particularly in 
Taiwan and Australia, as is Iran, North Korea, and an array of 
non-state actors including criminal organizations, terrorist 
groups, and hacktivists.54 These groups are employing a range 
of tactics to undermine trust in electoral processes ranging from 
directly or indirectly intimidating voters to compromising 
candidates by releasing damaging (and potentially fabricated) 
information.55 
It is impossible to say with certainty what the long-term 
impacts have been of Russian, Chinese, and other 
state-sponsored efforts to undermine trust in democratic 
elections.56 John Sides, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck, for 
example, did not find a lasting measurable impact of Russia’s 
efforts in the United States following the 2016 election,57 while 
Yochai Benker, Robert Farris, and Hal Roberts have argued 
“that Fox News was far more influential in the spread of false 
 
 52. See id. (describing the “Russian social media trolls” that spread 
rumors to create confusion during the 2016 election).  
 53. See Tim Mak, Former U.S. Diplomat Warns China Is Emulating 
Russian Political Interference, NAT. PUB. RADIO (June 20, 2018, 4:19 PM), 
https://perma.cc/W2N6-NMRC (discussing a former U.S. official’s warning 
that nations, including China, Iran, and North Korea, are beginning to 
interfere with elections). 
 54. See id. (discussing the National Security Council’s observation that 
China, Iran, and North Korea are discovering that cyberspace is a good outlet 
for their political agendas). 
 55. See, e.g., JAKUB JANDA, EUR. VALUES: KREMLIN WATCH REP., A 
FRAMEWORK GUIDE TO TOOLS FOR COUNTERING HOSTILE FOREIGN ELECTORAL 
INTERFERENCE, 13–15 (2017), https://perma.cc/B22B-7HB9 (PDF) (listing 
thirty-five ways the integrity of an election can be compromised by foreign 
actors). 
 56. See Farrell & Schneier, supra note 48 (citing JOHN SIDES ET AL., 
IDENTITY CRISIS: THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND THE BATTLE FOR THE 
MEANING OF AMERICA (2018)).  
 57. Id. (citing JOHN SIDES ET AL., IDENTITY CRISIS: THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGN AND THE BATTLE FOR THE MEANING OF AMERICA (2018)). 
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news stories than any Russian effort.”58 Still, the fact that such 
efforts are spreading and that, to date, the efforts of the U.S. 
government, allied nations, and internet platforms have proven 
insufficient to stem the flood raises questions about how best to 
inoculate both advanced and emerging democracies against 
these threats, some of which stem from authoritarian regimes 
as is discussed next. 
C.  Digital Repression 
As Farrell and Schneier have argued, “[c]ybersecurity today 
is not only about computer systems. It’s also about the ways 
attackers can use computer systems to manipulate and 
undermine public expectations about democracy.”59 This process 
has only accelerated after the end of the Cold War, with the vast 
majority of nations enjoying some degree of internet access and 
more than thirty nations developing offensive cyber-attack 
capabilities.60 Rather than being the final nail in the coffin of 
authoritarianism, as was hoped by early cyber libertarians such 
as John Perry Barlow’s maxim in his Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace, “Governments of the Industrial 
World, you weary giants of flesh and steel . . . [,] [y]ou have no 
sovereignty where we gather.”61 Instead, illiberal regimes from 
Damascus to Beijing have coopted the internet to entrench their 
power and control their populations.62 The autocratic threat to 
democracy is therefore not confined to election interference or 
 
 58. Id. (quoting YOCHAI BENKLER ET AL., NETWORK PROPAGANDA: 
MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION, AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
(2018)).  
 59. Id. 
 60. See id. (contrasting the Cold War era to today); Steve Ranger, US 
Intelligence: 30 Countries Building Cyber Attack Capabilities, ZDNET (Jan. 5, 
2017), https://perma.cc/QMP3-UYAR (claiming that more than thirty nations 
have started to develop offensive cyber-attack strategies in response to 
increased cybersecurity threats).  
 61. Christopher Shea, Sovereignty in Cyberspace, INT’L. ECON. L. & POL’Y 
BLOG (Jan. 15, 2006), https://perma.cc/CZ5D-8HKG. 
 62. See EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF 
INTERNET FREEDOM 100–03 (2011) (arguing that the internet presents many 
avenues through which governments can censor information, including 
outsourcing). 
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misinformation campaigns.63 There are myriad other ways in 
which illiberal regimes are using digital technologies to 
undermine democratic values at home and abroad.64  
Generally conceived, digital repression is the coercive use of 
information and communication technologies by the state to 
exert control over potential and existing challenges and 
challengers.65 Digital repression includes a ranges of tactics 
through which states are able to use digital technologies to 
monitor and restrict the actions of their citizens, which include, 
but are not limited to, digital surveillance, advanced biometric 
monitoring, misinformation campaigns, and state-based 
hacking.66 While digital repression does not specifically entail 
the use of physical sanctions against an individual or 
organization, it often carries with it the implicit assumption 
that information gathered could be used for more violent 
means.67 This often has the outcome of inflicting a chilling effect 
on dissent against the state without sustained violence.68 
Furthermore, as discussed above, these repressive activities can 
be directed to individuals outside the state’s national borders, 
in some cases compelling them to organize domestic dissident 
groups or even compromise the election process itself.69 
 
 63. See id. at 13 (outlining political implications that an email in the 
United States had on foreign relationships with Iran, China, and the Soviet 
Union). 
 64. See id. at 99–101 (outlining ways that authoritarian governments can 
censor internet information, including using hyperlinks and aggregation). 
 65. See Erica Frantz et. al., Digital Repression in Autocracies 1–5 
(Varieties of Democracy Inst., Working Paper No. 27, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/6U5D-G58F (PDF) (defining digital repression and 
identifying the tools employed by governments engaging in it). 
 66. See Steven Feldstein, The Road to Digital Unfreedom: How Artificial 
Intelligence Is Reshaping Repression, 30 J. DEMOCRACY 40, 41 (2019) (arguing 
that AI technology and computer systems have provided autocracies with 
substantially more political control over constituents). 
 67. See id. at 42 (“Because of this omnipresence, [AI systems] can induce 
changes in behavior and create a significant ‘chilling effect’ even in the absence 
of sustained physical violence.”).  
 68. See id. (asserting that AI systems motivate the public to conform and 
avoid sending dissentious messages against the government). 
 69. See, e.g., Scott Shane, How Unwitting Americans Encountered 
Russian Operatives Online, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/6L7C-
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States have always repressed.70 Even democracies, 
particularly those democracies under threat,71 have used 
surveillance and sometimes physical repression against their 
own citizens.72 Repressive tactics include the violation of 
physical integrity rights, such as harassment, detainment, 
torture,73 and extrajudicial killings,74 as well as covert 
repression through monitoring and surveilling which can 
include wiretapping, organizational infiltration, and the use of 
informants and agents provocateur.75 Repression in all forms is 
 
KAKZ (recounting the Russian operators who created phony Heart of Texas 
and Blacktivist groups and announced rallies to interfere with the 2016 
election).  
 70. See Christian Davenport, State Repression and Political Order, 10 
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 1, 1 (Margaret Levi et al. eds., 2007) (proposing that 
repression is as old as “the founding of the nation-state”); see also ROBERT 
JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA FROM 1870 TO 
THE PRESENT 547 (1978) (“Political repression has been an important and 
neglected factor in shaping major aspects of American political development 
since 1870.”).  
 71. See Rudolph Rummel, Democracy, Power, Genocide, and Mass 
Murder, 39 J. CONFLICT RES. 3, 3 (1995) (articulating that governments, 
themselves, commit democide and repress their citizens). 
 72. See generally CHRISTIAN DAVENPORT, STATE REPRESSION AND THE 
DOMESTIC DEMOCRATIC PEACE (2007) (discussing the repressive practices of the 
then Hutu-led government); see also Courtenay Conrad et al., Torture and the 
Limits of Democratic Institutions, 55 J. PEACE RSCH. 3, 4 (2018) (highlighting 
the approval of executives in democratic nations that engage in torture and 
repression). 
 73. See DARIUS REJALI, TORTURE AND DEMOCRACY 1–3 (2007) (arguing that 
there are physical forms of torture but also silent torture tactics that generally 
go unnoticed). 
 74. See Matthew Krain, State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and 
Severity of Genocides and Politicides, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 331, 332 (1997) 
(asserting that the internal and external characteristics of a state influence 
the degree of genocide and politicide therein); see generally MANUS I. 
MIDLARSKY, THE KILLING TRAP: GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2005) 
(offering a comparative analysis of genocides, politicides, and ethnic 
cleansings); BENJAMIN A. VALENTINO, FINAL SOLUTIONS: MASS KILLING AND 
GENOCIDE IN THE 20TH CENTURY (Robert J. Art et al. eds., 2004) (discussing 
mass killings). 
 75. See Christian Davenport, Understanding Covert Repressive Action: 
The Case of the U.S. Government Against the Republic of New Africa, 49 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 120, 122 (2005) (describing the numerous covert techniques 
that nations can use to learn about its constituents, the information spread 
therein, and the social movements taking hold).  
Stemler.PostBlueline.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2021  5:03 PM 
DEFENDING DEMOCRACY  1765 
 
costly for the state, and its citizens.76 Repression carries the 
physical costs of maintaining a coercive apparatus and, in more 
open regimes, it carries the potential audience costs of having 
these actions exposed to the public.77 States choose to incur 
these costs when they are under (real or perceived) threat, 
which may be created or reinforced through disinformation.78  
While the repressive power and potential of the state is not 
a new phenomenon, digital technologies are offering a fresh 
platform through which governments can exercise their powers 
of control and self-preservation domestically.79 Rather than 
offering the liberating potential originally associated with these 
technologies,80 many are now arguing that “social media [is] 
driving the spread of authoritarian practices.”81 Examples of 
this phenomenon include the Arab Spring, as well as more 
recent conflicts across the Middle East, and beyond.82 
Digital technologies are changing the nature of state 
repression in two primary ways. First, the speed and scope with 
which information can be collected and processed is far greater 
than any monitoring or surveillance techniques of the past.83 As 
Ron Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski write, “[d]igital information 
 
 76. See Davenport, supra note 70, at 4 (exploring the costs associated 
with repression and the cost-benefit analysis employed by repressive leaders). 
 77. See id. at 10 (noting that democratic nations have increased costs 
associated with repressive action because officials are held accountable 
through the electoral process). 
 78. See DAVENPORT, supra note 72, at 2 (discussing the Hutu- and 
Tutsi-led governments’ repressive tactics). 
 79. See Ronald J. Deibert, Three Painful Truths About Social Media, 30 
J. DEMOCRACY 25, 31 (2019) (arguing that social media enables 
authoritarianism). 
 80. See Larry Diamond, Liberation Technology, 21 J. DEMOCRACY 69, 70 
(2010) (examining social media as a tool for activists to organize against 
authoritarianism).  
 81. Deibert, supra note 79, at 31. 
 82. See, e.g., Caroline Caywood, This Is How Social Media Is Being Used 
in the Middle East, NAT’L INT. (Nov. 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/96LF-8258 
(“Governments are using social media to rally domestic and foreign support 
for their policies.”). 
 83. See Ronald Deibert & Rafal Rohozinski, Liberation vs. Control: The 
Future of Cyberspace, 21 J. DEMOCRACY 43, 43 (2010) (noting that no 
technology other than digital technology has “grown with such speed and 
spread so far geographically in such a short period of time”). 
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can be easily tracked and traced, and then tied to specific 
individuals who themselves can be mapped in space and time 
with a degree of sophistication that would make the greatest 
tyrants of days past envious.”84 This can be done on a much 
wider swath of the population than was ever previously possible. 
For example, states threatened by mass mobilization are able to 
closely monitor, in real-time, crowd formations with the 
potential to become mass rallies, allowing police to be put on 
standby to immediately break up a protest before it grows.85  
Second, the nature of repressive technologies has shifted 
the capacity required for repression which in turn has shifted 
the costs. As outlined above, repression is costly.86 It carries the 
physical costs associated with maintaining a repressive 
apparatus (e.g., training and paying soldiers and police, 
maintaining detention facilities, etc.).87 In the past, mass 
surveillance required an extensive network of informers.88 In 
Poland in 1981, for example, at the height of the Sluzba 
Bezpieczenstwa’s (Security Service) work to undermine the 
Solidarity movement, there were an estimated 84,000 
informers.89 New technologies produce the same level of 
surveillance or greater from far fewer people.90 Such digital 
 
 84. Id. at 44. 
 85. See Feldstein, supra note 66, at 44 (noting that governments can use 
AI to control protests). 
 86. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.  
 87. See Feldstein, supra note 66, at 43 (“[Autocrats] relying on security 
forces to repress their citizenry . . . entails . . . resource costs and political 
risk.”).  
 88. See, e.g., Andreas Lichter et al., The Long-Term Costs of Government 
Surveillance: Insights from Stasi Spying in East Germany 2 (SOEPpapers, 
Working Paper No. 865, 2016), https://perma.cc/3DDH-2BRX (PDF) (stating 
that the number of informants relied on by East Germany’s Stasi secret police 
“accounted for more than one percent of the East German population in the 
1980s”). 
 89. See Matthew Day, Polish Secret Police: How and Why the Poles Spied 
on Their Own People, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 18, 2011, 7:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/C88T-MKS6 (describing how the Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa “was 
at the forefront of the Polish authoritarian state’s long war against opposition 
to communist rule”).  
 90. See Feldstein, supra note 66, at 42 (“[T]he most advanced surveillance 
operations rely on relatively few human agents: Many functions are instead 
automated through AI.”).  
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technologies can be expensive. The Xinjian authorities, for 
example, reportedly budgeted more than $1 billion in the first 
quarter of 2017 for the monitoring and detention of the Uyghur 
population there.91 Yet this is likely a low figure when compared 
with the amount the Chinese state would have spent to 
construct a comparable system without using digital 
technologies.92 
Steven Feldstein attributes the impacts of digital 
repression to the increased availability of big data from both 
public and private sources, enhanced machine learning and 
algorithmic approaches to the processing of that data, and the 
corresponding advances in computer processing power.93 As 
Feldstein writes, “[f]rom facial-recognition technologies that 
cross-check real-time images against massive databases to 
algorithms that crawl social media for signs of opposition 
activity, these innovations are a game-changer for authoritarian 
efforts to shape discourse and crush opposition voices.”94 In 
many ways digital technologies have ushered us into a new era, 
what Larry Diamond calls “postmodern totalitarianism,” in 
which we appear to be free to go about our daily lives, but 
governments are controlling and censoring all information 
flows.95 
Furthermore, digital technologies serve a very specific 
function for autocratic states. While leader removal by coups 
and civil war defeats are declining, it is increasingly common for 
leaders to be removed based on internal pressure and mass 
 
 91. See Josh Chin & Clément Bürge, Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How 
China’s Surveillance State Overwhelms Daily Life, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2017, 
10:58 PM), https://perma.cc/SM8E-QG8B (“China’s efforts to snuff out a 
violent separatist movement . . . have turned the autonomous region of 
Xinjiang . . . into a laboratory for high-tech social controls that civil-liberties 
activists say the government wants to roll out across the country.”). 
 92. See Feldstein, supra note 66, at 45–46 (discussing the budget for 
“security-related investment projects”). 
 93. Id. at 41. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Larry Diamond, The Threat of Postmodern Totalitarianism, 20 J. 
DEMOCRACY 20, 23 (2019) (comparing this reality to “a nightmarish 
modern-day version of Nineteen Eighty-Four”). 
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public uprisings.96 In this way, “the gravest threats to 
authoritarian survival today may be coming not from insider-led 
rebellions, but from discontented publics on the streets or at the 
ballot box.”97 Such observations might explain Vladimir Putin’s 
response to the December 2011 protests in Russia,98 along with 
the color revolutions,99 and Arab Spring.100 These new trends in 
leadership removal increase the incentives for leaders to pursue 
repressive tactics capable of monitoring public opinion and 
mobilization potential.101  
As is discussed further in Parts III and IV, the target of 
digital repression need not solely be a country’s own citizens. 
Surveillance, state-sponsored hacks, election interference, and 
misinformation campaigns have all been documented strategies 
of autocratic governments’ attempts at destabilizing rivals and 
undermining democracy globally.102 In addition to challenging 
the functioning of democratic governments, there have also been 
attempts to change the behavior of non-state actors in pursuit 
 
 96. See Feldstein, supra note 66, at 43 (stating that popular revolt and 
electoral defeat “have overtaken coups” as “the most common causes of 
departure for dictators”).  
 97. Id. 
 98. See Michael Crowley, Why Putin Hates Hillary, POLITICO (July 25, 
2016, 6:20 PM), https://perma.cc/2WVT-KW98 (stating Putin blamed Hillary 
Clinton for rigging Russian elections and causing the protests). 
 99. See Yulia Nikitina, The “Color Revolutions” and “Arab Spring” in 
Russian Official Discourse, 14 CONNECTIONS 87, 88 (2014) (stating the “main 
concern” with the color revolution is that problems are not being resolved 
through the constitution or existing laws, but instead through “revolutions” 
and “street democracy.”). 
 100. See id. at 92–93 (discussing Putin’s negative reaction to Western 
intervention of parties involved in the Arab Spring). 
 101. See Feldstein, supra note 66, at 43 (“[A]utocratic leaders are 
embracing digital tactics for monitoring, surveilling, and harassing civil 
society movements and for distorting elections.”). 
 102. See Charles Marsh, How Autocratic Regimes Try to Undermine 
Democracy at Home and Abroad, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT BORDERS (Dec. 17, 
2017), https://perma.cc/U9SJ-HBHP (summarizing recent research on 
autocrats’ attempts to weaken democracy using, among other tactics, “internet 
censorship and controlled narratives”). 
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of a global liberal agenda, such as human rights NGOs.103 
Moreover, while the focus of this Article is mainly on digital 
influence from Russia and China, the nature of digital 
technologies is impacting which states have the ability to 
monitor and repress.104 As the financial and material costs of 
digital repression decrease, the capacity to influence is no longer 
confined to global powers.105 Finally, much like repression itself, 
digital repression is not and will not be confined to autocratic 
regimes. Democracies monitor, surveille, and repress their own 
citizens, particularly in times of threat.106 We should, therefore, 
not only look for digital repression and interference from our 
autocratic rivals but acknowledge its potential even within the 
most stalwart democracies, including the United States, which 
we turn to next. 
III.  U.S. Efforts to Protect Democratic Institutions 
When adversaries interfere with elections, they threaten 
more than the integrity of electoral process, they threaten 
collective faith in democracy. Indeed, a core focus of the Russian 
strategy to undermine confidence in the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election was not necessarily to target voting machines directly, 
 
 103. See, e.g., Bill Marczak et al., Missing Link: Tibetan Groups Targeted 
with 1-Click Mobile Exploits (Citizen Lab 2019), https://perma.cc/R8XL-CQCS 
(“[S]enior members of Tibetan groups received malicious links in individually 
tailored WhatsApp text exchanges with operators posing as NGO workers, 
journalists, and other fake personas.”); JOHN SCOTT-RAILTON ET AL., RECKLESS 
VII: WIFE OF JOURNALIST SLAIN IN CARTEL-LINKED KILLING TARGETED WITH 
NSO GROUP’S SPYWARE 8–9 (2019), https://perma.cc/X8B6-9SPJ (PDF) 
(describing NSO Group’s attempts to target various non-state actors, 
including journalists, lawyers, and anti-corruption activists). 
 104. See Adrian Shahbaz, The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism, in 
FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM ON THE NET 2018, 1 (2018), https://perma.cc/53HC-
C7EK (PDF) (“[A] cohort of countries is moving toward digital 
authoritarianism by embracing the Chinese model of extensive censorship and 
automated surveillance systems.”). 
 105. See id. at 9 (listing countries, such as Rwanda, Bahrain, and 
Kazakhstan, that use telecommunications infrastructure, AI surveillance, and 
trainings in a similar way as China). 
 106. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 70, at 559 (“[I]ncreased strain and tension 
in society and increased dissent (which frequently, but not always, occur 
together) have been the most important causes of political authorities 
increasing political repression.”). 
Stemler.PostBlueline.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2021  5:03 PM 
1770 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1747 (2020) 
 
but instead to use low-cost techniques through social media and 
otherwise to “undermine and distract the Clinton campaign,” 
which would, to Russia’s delight, result in a benefit to Donald 
Trump’s campaign.107 This is why so many state and private 
actors have taken action in response to Russia’s “sweeping and 
systematic” interference in both U.S. and European elections, 
and why it is so surprising that the U.S. federal government did 
not take more comprehensive and decisive action to counter this 
ongoing threat ahead of the 2020 election cycle.108 This section 
summarizes attempts within the U.S.’s public and private 
sectors to improve election security. It concludes by identifying 
particular weaknesses in the overall U.S. response to date, 
while Part V offers a series of steps for how to fill these 
governance gaps.   
A.  U.S. Efforts to Safeguard its Election Infrastructure 
This section begins by discussing federal and state 
protections for voting infrastructure. We next move on to 
analyze companion efforts from civil society and the private 
sector. After that, we explore U.S. efforts to combat digital 
repression and then offer several critiques of U.S. efforts to 
make democracy harder to hack. 
1.  Federal & State Approaches to Election Security 
In the United States, elections are primarily administered 
by the states.109 Unlike other countries with federal 
governments, such as Australia explored in Part IV, the U.S. 
federal government has historically played a minimal role in 
 
 107. Eric Geller, Collusion Aside, Mueller Found Abundant Evidence of 
Russian Election Plot, POLITICO (Apr. 18, 2019, 12:35 PM), 
https://perma.cc/L3S3-9CJZ.  
 108. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF SPECIAL COUNS., REPORT ON THE 
INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION 1 (2019) [hereinafter MUELLER REPORT], https://perma.cc/QBB3-
QGF4 (PDF) (“The Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential 
election in sweeping and systematic fashion.”).  
 109. See Elections & Voting, WHITE HOUSE, https://perma.cc/T7TU-24MA 
(stating that the federal government “grant[s] the states wide latitude in how 
they administer elections”). 
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election oversight.110 Yet, as the Congressional Research Service 
has noted, “the federal government . . . has steadily increased 
its presence in campaigns and elections in the past fifty years. 
Altogether, dozens of congressional committees and federal 
agencies could be involved in federal elections under current 
law.”111 As a result, there is a patchwork of voting systems 
throughout the country, with many states—including core 
swing states like Pennsylvania—using outdated voting 
machines and, as of August 2019, more than ten using paperless 
ballots, which leave no paper trail preventing an effective 
post-election audit in the aftermath of a cyber-attack.112 While 
the federal government can regulate aspects of federal voting 
and appropriate funds for state voting systems113 along with, of 
course, providing for the common defense,114 the political 
response at the federal level can, as of this writing, at best be 
described as apathetic to election security concerns.115   
 
 110. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45302, FEDERAL ROLE IN 
U.S. CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS: AN OVERVIEW i (2018) https://perma.cc/3LYE-
2SBT (PDF) (“Conventional wisdom holds that the federal government plays 
[a] relatively little role in U.S. campaigns and elections.”). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Tim Lau, U.S. Elections Are Still Vulnerable to Foreign Hacking, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/DGY8-WSVC 
(“Many states have outdated election security infrastructure . . . .”); 
CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO ET AL., DEFENDING ELECTIONS: FEDERAL FUNDING 
NEEDS FOR STATE ELECTION SECURITY 4 (2019), https://perma.cc/33FK-UF34 
(PDF) (“Aging voting systems often use outdated hardware . . . .”).  
 113. See Dylan Lynch & Wendy Underhill, Election Security Cybersecurity: 
What Legislators (and Others) Need to Know, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. 
(Feb. 4, 2019), https://perma.cc/HLJ4-F5MY (stating that the federal 
government acts “in an advisory role” to states focused on election security). 
 114. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power 
To . . . provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States.”).  
 115. See Li Zhou, Republicans Are Still Blocking Election Security Bills 
After Mueller’s Testimony, VOX (July 25, 2019, 11:47 AM), 
https://perma.cc/42S7-UBHC (explaining that Republicans were blocking 
“Democratic efforts to put stronger election security restrictions in place”); 
Josh Dawsey et al., As Security Officials Prepare for Russian Attack on 2020 
Presidential Race, Trump and Aides Play Down Threat, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 
2019, 8:21 AM), https://perma.cc/Q3CA-G45H (“During discussions in the Oval 
Office, Trump has regularly conflated the threat of foreign interference with 
attacks on the legitimacy of his election . . . .”). 
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Congress did appropriate $380 million for state election 
security efforts after the 2016 election,116 along with another 
$425 million in December 2019.117 These are steps in the right 
direction, and are in line broadly with how much it would cost 
to replace paperless voting machines across the nation, and will 
allow more states to upgrade their voting equipment and 
conduct post-election audits.118 Yet these appropriations did not 
stem from any authority created in the aftermath of the 2016 
election.119 Instead, these were part of a 2002 bill, the Help 
America Vote Act,120 passed as a consequence of the contested 
presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore in 
2000.121 Multiple bills, some bipartisan, were subsequently 
proposed and passed by one of the two chambers of Congress, 
but thus far all have stalled.122 In particular, the most widely 
reported on bill, the Election Security Act, would have pushed 
states to implement back-up paper ballots and would have 
provided $1 billion in election security grants for 
 
 116. See Press Release, U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, U.S. Election 
Assistance Commission to Administer $380 Million in 2018 HAVA Election 
Security Funds (Mar. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/2JSH-ZBA2; see also Blake 
Paterson & Ally J. Levine, Fund Meant to Protect Elections May Be Too Little, 
Too Late, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 21, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://perma.cc/YG9X-GAUP 
(“[Q]uestions remain about how much [the $380 million set aside for election 
infrastructure] will help secure the 2018 election.”). 
 117. See Miles Parks, Congress Allocates $425 Million for Election Security 
in New Legislation, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 16, 2019, 5:02 PM), 
https://perma.cc/28PC-GYBT. 
 118. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., ESTIMATE FOR THE COST OF REPLACING 
PAPERLESS, COMPUTERIZED VOTING MACHINES 1, https://perma.cc/5PHX-RABA 
(PDF) (estimating the cost would “range [from] $130 million to $400 million”). 
 119. See GARRETT, supra note 110, at 8 (describing the Help America Vote 
Act of 2002). 
 120. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 252, 116 Stat. 1666. 
 121. See GARRETT, supra note 110, at 8 (“Congress enacted the Help 
America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002, after the disputed 2000 presidential 
election raised concerns about election administration, ballot design, and 
voting equipment around the country.”). 
 122. See, e.g., Katherine Tully-McManus, House Passes Election Security 
Measure Requiring Cybersecurity Safeguards, Paper Ballots, ROLL CALL (Jun. 
27, 2019, 4:49 PM), https://perma.cc/4HN6-63DX (noting that “an election 
security measure” passed by the House “faces stiff opposition from 
Republicans” in the Senate). 
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modernization.123 However, Senate Majority Leader, Mitch 
McConnell, argued that such a bill would federalize the election 
process and take control away from states.124  
The Senate Intelligence Committee released a report in 
2019 on the 2016 election and provided recommendations for 
securing elections.125 These recommendations—including the 
need for paper ballots—have yet to be implemented in any 
concerted way.126 In addition, a widely disseminated report from 
the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 
entitled Securing the Vote, put together a series of 
recommendations, which included: election administrators 
“routinely assess[ing] the integrity of voter registration 
databases,” ensuring backups for pollbooks should disruptions 
occur, conducting regular penetration testing, requiring paper 
ballots along with post-election audits and the removal of 
“[v]oting machines that do not provide the capacity for 
independent auditing,” and empowering the National Institute 
for Standards and Technology (NIST) to “develop security 
standards and verification and validation protocols for 
electronic pollbooks in addition to the standards and verification 
and validation protocols they have developed for voting 
systems.”127 However, most of these recommendations have 
similarly not been acted upon as of this writing.128 
 
 123. See Maggie Miller, 2020 Democrats Accelerate Push for Action to 
Secure Elections, HILL (June 30, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/79KU-S5JZ 
(describing the bill as a way to “strengthen cybersecurity information sharing 
and require all jurisdictions to perform post-election audits”).  
 124. See id. (reporting McConnell’s argument); see also Alex Padill, What 
Do States Need to Secure Upcoming Elections?, PBS NEWS HOUR (Aug. 2, 2018, 
6:30 PM), https://perma.cc/2RXM-RGKR (asserting that election security 
should be viewed as a matter of national defense, to which $700 billion is 
dedicated each year).  
 125. S. REP. NO. 116-XX, at 54 (2019), https://perma.cc/5Q3Y-N78L (PDF).  
 126. See Dana Farrington, READ: Senate Intelligence Report on Russian 
Interference in the 2016 Election, NAT. PUB. RADIO (July 25, 2019, 3:08 PM), 
https://perma.cc/NY7Y-FK8M (stating “Congress has been slow to take action” 
on the report’s recommendations). 
 127. SECURING THE VOTE, supra note 22, at 5–7.   
 128. C.f. Miller, supra note 123 (noting that as of June 2019, the year 
following the Securing the Vote report, a technology entrepreneur was still 
concerned about “foreign interference in elections”). 
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As a matter of national defense, election security has 
received more attention at the federal level through agencies 
such as the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of 
Defense, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National 
Security Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation.129 Most 
notably, DHS designated the election infrastructure130 as 
critical infrastructure.131 This means that DHS can offer states 
resources and intelligence insights to ensure election security.132 
It does not mean, however, the same degree of regulatory 
oversight as is common in other jurisdictions, such as the 
European Union discussed in Part IV. Despite a multitude of 
efforts, the pains taken by various U.S. agencies and 
departments have been relatively ad hoc and siloed.133 This is 
likely why the Director of National Intelligence established the 
position of Intelligence Community Election Threats Executive 
 
 129. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11265, CAMPAIGN AND 
ELECTION SECURITY POLICY: BRIEF INTRODUCTION 1–2 (2019) 
https://perma.cc/5QZ7-N2P4 (PDF) (discussing agency roles in election 
security). 
 130. “Election infrastructure” includes “storage facilities, polling places, 
and centralized vote tabulations locations used to support the election process, 
and information and communications technology to include voter registration 
databases, voting machines, and other systems to manage the election process 
and report and display results on behalf of state and local governments.” Press 
Release, Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary 
Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election Infrastructure as a Critical 
Infrastructure Subsector (Jan. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/LGD8-D5BJ; see 
Danielle Root et al., Election Security in All 50 States: Defending America’s 
Elections, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 12, 2018, 12:01 AM), 
https://perma.cc/T9LE-DWDS (describing election infrastructure across the 
country). 
 131. See Johnson, supra note 130 (“Given the vital role elections play in 
this country, it has been determined that certain systems and assets of 
election infrastructure meet the definition of critical infrastructure.”). 
 132. See Kaveh Waddell, Why Elections Are Now Classified as ‘Critical 
Infrastructure,’ ATLANTIC (Jan. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/6GXU-GP6D (“[The 
classification] makes it easier for DHS to offer [state and local organizations] 
resources and intelligence information.”).  
 133. See Julian E. Barnes, Intelligence Chief Names New Election Security 
Oversight Official, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/83TU-5CNU 
(noting that analysts viewed the intelligence community’s increased focus on 
election security before the 2018 midterm races as rather impromptu). 
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(ETE) in July of 2019.134 The goal of that position is to coordinate 
election security activities across the federal government.135 
Another useful step in this same vein has been the creation of 
Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis 
Center (EI-ISAC) to help share information about cyber threats 
and best practices with election agencies and other interested 
stakeholders.136 But it is still unclear whether such coordination 
will ultimately address the problems associated with election 
insecurity in the United States, to say nothing of other 
vulnerable democracies.  
At the state level, many state and local governments have 
organized and funded their own initiatives to improve election 
security in the absence of effective federal leadership.137 For 
example, California created the Office of Elections 
Cybersecurity.138 Virginia switched from paperless electronic 
voting to a statewide paper ballot system.139 Colorado instituted 
a risk-limiting audit that is being emulated by other states.140 
Indiana passed a plan to phase out paperless voting machines 
 
 134. Press Release, Daniel R. Coats, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Director of 
National Intelligence Daniel R. Coats Establishes Intelligence Community 
Election Threats Executive (July 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/V77W-AGS7. 
 135. See id. (“[T]he . . . Election Threats Executive (ETE) . . . will 
coordinate and integrate all election security activities, initiatives, and 
programs across the [Intelligence Community] and synchronize intelligence 
efforts in support of the broader U.S. government.”). 
 136. See Elections Infrastructure ISAC, CTR. FOR INTERNET SEC., 
https://perma.cc/93ZZ-QUT7. 
 137. See Root et al., supra note 130 (describing New York’s new election 
security initiative, among others). 
 138. See Sara Friedman, California Creates Elections Security Office, GCN 
(Aug. 31, 2018), https://perma.cc/6635-PH67 (reporting on the new 
organization). 
 139. See Root et al., supra note 130 (describing Virginia’s switch to a paper 
ballot system). 
 140. See Jesse Paul, Colorado’s First-of-its-Kind Election Audit Is 
Complete, with All Participating Counties Passing, DENVER POST (Nov. 22, 
2017, 1:59 PM), https://perma.cc/D6RK-P5DF (stating the process involves the 
“manual recount of a sample of ballots from the more than 50 counties that 
had elections this year and compar[ing] them with how they were interpreted 
by tabulating machines”). 
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fully by 2029.141 In total, as of this writing at least thirty-six 
states have made efforts to improve and are working with DHS 
or the National Guard to assess and identify voting systems.142 
However, wait times for help, especially with DHS, are 
reportedly very long (up to nine months), and with state and 
local elections happening multiple times per year, it is likely 
that vulnerabilities will go unaddressed for several more 
election cycles.143 
2.  Private Sector & Civil Society Efforts 
In the United States (and unlike Australia, as we will see), 
election security has very deep ties with the private sector and 
is a topic watched closely, but largely passively, by civil society 
organizations and academia.144 The private sector plays such a 
strong role because voting machines are manufactured without 
direct government involvement and are only subject to ex post 
testing.145 Thus, among the first lines of defense of election 
infrastructure security lies primarily in the hands of private 
voting machine manufacturers, who despite the various stress 
tests required by many states, produce equipment that may still 
 
 141. See Tom Davies, Indiana Election Upgrade Leaves Widespread 
Paperless Voting, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 27, 2019), https://perma.cc/79GS-
JBNK (noting that paperless voting machines are not prohibited until 2029). 
 142. See Root et al., supra note 130 (explaining that those states are 
working with federal entities in “assessing and identifying potential threats 
to voter registration systems”). 
 143. See Tim Starks, The Latest 2018 Election-Hacking Threat: 9-Month 
Wait for Government Help, POLITICO (Dec. 29, 2017, 5:05 AM), 
https://perma.cc/RRY9-UGJD (“[S]ome states might not get the service until 
weeks before the November midterms and may remain unaware of flaws that 
could allow homegrown cyber vandals or foreign intelligence agencies to target 
voter registration databases and election offices’ computer networks . . . .”).  
 144. See Joseph Marks, The Cybersecurity 202: Even a Voting Machine 
Company Is Pushing for Election Security Legislation, WASH. POST (June 10, 
2019, 7:13 AM), https://perma.cc/PU7B-V2PJ (noting that because one 
company’s “commitment to third-party testing is entirely voluntary, it also 
gets to say who those third-party testers are”). 
 145. See id. (reporting that the company urged Congress to pass legislation 
that would “mandate security testing of voting equipment by outside 
researchers”); Tim Starks, Voting Machine Vendors Under Pressure, POLITICO 
(July 12, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://perma.cc/LE5U-KQWG (stating that voting 
machine vendors sell electronic voting machines without paper backups).  
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contain vulnerabilities that can go undetected.146 While 
manufacturers have taken steps to boost election infrastructure 
security, such as by refusing to sell paperless machines to those 
jurisdictions that do not have paper voting machines as their 
primary machines, machines continue to be in operation 
without any serious recall regime in place and there are no legal 
obligations to notify election officials when vulnerabilities and 
breaches are detected.147 “I know America’s voting machines are 
vulnerable,” said J. Alex Halderman during Congressional 
testimony, “because my colleagues and I have hacked 
them— repeatedly—as part of a decade of research studying the 
technology that operates elections and learning how to make it 
stronger.”148 He has gone on to argue: “Our highly computerized 
election infrastructure is vulnerable to sabotage and even to 
cyberattacks that could change votes.”149  
Halderman demonstrated, for example, how a mock contest 
between George Washington and Benedict Arnold could be won 
by the latter, simply by infecting a voting machine’s memory 
with malware.150 The vulnerabilities that Halderman and his 
group have exploited include not only outdated voting machines, 
but also election-management systems that design ballots, 
which election officials often access via memory cards that may 
 
 146. For a list of standards and tests required of voting machines, see 
Voting System Standards, Testing and Certification, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGIS. (Aug. 6, 2018), https://perma.cc/4JHL-V3VG.  
 147. See Lily Hay Newman, Election Security Is Still Hurting at Every 
Level, WIRED (June 6, 2019, 12:01 AM), [hereinafter Newman I] 
https://perma.cc/H8XC-QHHR (quoting the president of Verified Voting, as 
saying that “I don’t think the for-profit commercial model works particularly 
well for voting systems, because there’s not enough profit in them to do really 
good R&D”). 
 148. Steve Freiss, Hacking the Vote: It’s Easier Than You Think, MICH. 
ALUMNI ASS’N, https://perma.cc/J9QA-D6SX.  
 149. Alexander Freund, Democracy in Danger: Elections are Easy to 
Manipulate, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Oct. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/7Q63-LXBG.   
 150. See Jen Schwartz, The Vulnerabilities of Our Voting Machines, SCI. 
AM. (Nov. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/GP64-2MHX (“[W]ithout a paper trail of 
each vote, neither the voters nor a human auditor could check for 
discrepancies. In real elections, too, about 20 percent of voters nationally still 
cast electronic ballots only.”).  
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be corrupted.151 Other cybersecurity researchers have 
corroborated these findings, including those affiliated with the 
Defcon hacker conference, and found numerous vulnerabilities 
in many voting machines still in use across more than 
twenty-six states in 2019.152 
Within civil society and academia, numerous 
comprehensive reports on election security have been written 
exploring what to do about these problems.153 The most notable 
of these publications include the National Academies of 
Sciences’ Securing the Vote mentioned above; the Brennan 
Center for Justice at New York University School of Law’s 
Defending Elections; and the Center for American Progress’s 
Election Security in All 50 States.154 However, once again, 
because of political stagnation, there has been very little 
implementation of their policy proposals.155 As for active 
participation in election security, some universities play a role 
in certifying and testing voting machines, but this role is 
limited.156 
B.  U.S. Attempts to Combat Digital Repression 
Unlike the tentative steps that have been taken to protect 
U.S. election infrastructure, the U.S. government’s response to 
misinformation remains nascent, which is in part due to 
demanding requirements of the First Amendment and deep 
 
 151. See id. (discussing how malicious code can be introduced to the 
election-management systems). 
 152. See Lily Hay Newman, Some Voting Machines Still Have Decade-Old 
Vulnerabilities, WIRED (Sept. 26, 2019, 2:41 PM), https://perma.cc/S6E7-L38X 
[hereinafter Newman II] (highlighting “detailed vulnerability findings related 
to six models of voting machines” including one model “used in 28 states in 
2018” and another model “used in 26 states that same year”). 
 153. See, e.g., SECURING THE VOTE, supra note 22, at xii (outlining 
numerous recommendations “designed to harden our election infrastructure 
and safeguard its integrity and credibility”).  
 154. See generally id.; DELUZIO, supra note 112; Root, supra note 130.  
 155. See supra notes 115–143 and accompanying text.  
 156. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-241(b) (West 2020) (allowing 
Connecticut’s Secretary of State to enter into agreements with universities to 
assist with ensuring the integrity of voting equipment); see also IND. CODE. 
ANN. § 3-11-16-4 (West 2020) (allowing Indiana election officials to work with 
universities to perform audits and assist with certifications).  
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divisions about the proper role of the federal government in 
policing content.157 There are, however, a patchwork of state 
laws aimed at combatting the effects of misinformation.158 One 
example is a California law that requires the state’s Department 
of Education to provide a list of education materials on its 
websites to teach students how to distinguish misinformation 
from real news and advertisements.159 The impetus behind the 
law was a Stanford University study,160 which found that 82 
percent of middle school students could not distinguish between 
advertisements and news stories.161 Other states have followed 
suit, by including more programming related to misinformation 
and disinformation in their educational programming.162 
Congress has unsuccessfully tried to pass the Honest Ads 
Act,163 a bill that requires platform political ads to follow the 
same rules as the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, such 
 
 157. See Sara Prendergast, It Must be True, I Read It on the Internet: 
Regulating Fake News in the Digital Age, MICH. TECH. L. REV. (Mar. 4, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/8UYS-ULF2 (discussing the hesitancy of the United States to 
combat misinformation); John Samples, Why the Government Should Not 
Regulate Content Moderation of Social Media, CATO INST. (Apr. 9, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/E5DP-RK8T (noting that a California bill aimed at reducing 
the spread of misinformation on social media through the creation of an 
advisory board was vetoed by former Governor Jerry Brown, citing First 
Amendment concerns).  
 158. See Funke & Flamini, supra note 28 (listing state actions).  
 159. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51206.4 (West 2020) (ordering California’s 
Department of Education to provide a list of resources on media literacy); see 
also Funke & Flamini, supra note 28 (noting that California is one of a few 
states to enact legislation promoting media literacy); Susan Minichiello, 
California Now Has a Law to Bolster Media Literacy in Schools, PRESS 
DEMOCRAT (Sept. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/7VBR-RSKW (reporting that 
Gov. Jerry Brown signed the bill to encourage media literacy). 
 160. See Minichiello, supra note 159 (discussing the bill’s origins). 
 161. See SAM WINEBURG ET AL., EVALUATING INFORMATION: THE 
CORNERSTONE OF CIVIC ONLINE REASONING 10 (2016), https://perma.cc/FC3T-
9VQ6 (PDF) (“More than 80% of students believed that the [fake] 
advertisement . . . was a real news story.”).  
 162. See Funke & Flamini, supra note 28 (stating that at least twenty-four 
states are attempting to improve media literacy). 
 163. S. 1989, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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as identifying the organization or person sponsoring the ad.164 
In addition, the Act would require platforms to engage in 
“reasonable efforts” to ensure that ads are not purchased 
“directly or indirectly” by foreign governments.165 Major tech 
companies have strongly opposed such a bill, arguing instead for 
self-regulation.166 Some, such as Twitter, have come out with 
new limits—and even bans—on political ads on their platforms 
due, in part, to concerns over enabling the spread of 
misinformation,167 but as of this writing Facebook has not 
followed suit.168 
C.  Critiques of U.S. Response 
While there are many efforts afoot within the public and 
private sectors to improve the security of U.S. election 
infrastructure and combat digital repression, as the foregoing 
analysis made clear there remains a great deal to be done. 
Consider the work done at Defcon since 2017 that was 
referenced above.169 Defcon is the world’s largest “white hat” 
 
 164. See id. (requiring advertisement sponsors to provide their name, 
address, phone number, etc.); see also Tim Lau, The Honest Ads Act Explained, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 17, 2020) https://perma.cc/G56T-HJH8 (noting 
that the Honest Ads Act is still a proposed law before the United States 
Senate).  
 165. Honest Ads Act, S. 1989, 115th Cong.; see Natasha Bertrand, 
Senators Have a New Plan to Fix a Major Loophole that Let Russia Take 
Advantage of Facebook and Tech Giants, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 19, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/VF2B-7H3A (stating that the Act’s requirements are a 
departure from the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971).  
 166. See Ben Brody & Bill Allison, Lobbying Group for Facebook and 
Google to Pitch Self-Regulation of Ads, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 23, 2017, 8:49 PM), 
https://perma.cc/3VRB-VCFR (“[G]oogle, Facebook, and Twitter . . . pitch 
self-regulation instead of a proposed federal law requiring more disclosure for 
political advertising on their online platforms . . . .”). 
 167. See Kate Conger, Twitter Will Ban All Political Ads, C.E.O. Jack 
Dorsey Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/Q2L3-T6XG 
(“Twitter announce[d] that it would eliminate political ads, starting Nov. 22, 
[2019].”). 
 168. See Danielle Abril, Google and Twitter Changed Their Rules on 
Political Ads. Why Won’t Facebook?, FORTUNE (Nov. 22, 2019), (“Despite a 
recent political ad ban from Twitter and new limitations from Google, 
Facebook has yet to back down from its ‘anything goes’ policy.”).  
 169. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
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hacker conference, and it reports out the numerous ways its 
participants have been able to hack into U.S. voting machines 
annually.170 In its 2018 report, conference participants found, 
among other vulnerabilities, that: (1) a tabulator used by 
twenty-three states could be hacked via a network attack; (2) a 
machine used in eighteen states was able to be hacked within 
two minutes, which is remarkable considering that it takes the 
average voter six minutes to vote; and (3) hackers had the 
ability to wirelessly reprogram an electronic card used by many 
Americans to activate the voting terminal.171 The latter issue 
would allow a single voter to cast multiple ballots in a given 
voting session.172 As Senator Ron Wyden said at Defcon in 2019, 
“Election officials across the country as we speak are buying 
election systems that will be out of date the moment they open 
the box.”173 He added: “[This is] the election security equivalent 
of putting our military out there to go up against superpowers 
with a peashooter.”174 
The vulnerabilities exposed at Defcon stem from the lack of 
comprehensive federal and state oversight discussed above. 
Leaving voting machine hardware and software to the private 
 
 170. See Taylor Telford, Hackers Were Told to Break into U.S. Voting 
Machines. They Didn’t Have Much Trouble., WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/T85A-YCKJ (reporting on a conference that involves skilled 
hackers attempting to break into U.S. voting machines); see generally MATT 
BLAZE ET AL., DEF CON 26 VOTING VILLAGE: REPORT ON CYBER VULNERABILITIES 
IN U.S. ELECTION EQUIPMENT, DATABASES, AND INFRASTRUCTURE (2018), 
https://perma.cc/H7F8-LCV4 (PDF) [hereinafter DEFCON 2018] (reporting the 
findings of the Voting Village in 2018); MATT BLAZE ET AL., DEF CON 25 VOTING 
MACHINE HACKING VILLAGE: REPORT ON CYBER VULNERABILITIES IN U.S. 
ELECTION EQUIPMENT, DATABASES, AND INFRASTRUCTURE (2017), 
https://perma.cc/5Y83-ZLWV (PDF) [hereinafter DEFCON 2017] (discussing the 
findings from the 2017 Voting Village). 
 171. See DEFCON 2018, supra note 170, at 5 (noting various vulnerabilities 
in the U.S. voting process); see also Lily Hay Newman, Voting Machines Are 
Still Absurdly Vulnerable to Attacks, WIRED (Sept. 28, 2018, 11:04 AM), 
https://perma.cc/K3HW-CA82 [hereinafter Newman III] (“Many of the 
weaknesses Voting Village participants found were frustratingly basic, 
underscoring the need for a reckoning with manufacturers.”).  
 172. See DEFCON 2018, supra note 170, at 21 (explaining the 
vulnerabilities).  
 173. Telford, supra note 170. 
 174. Id. 
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sector without adequate regulatory oversight is insufficient to 
protect election security.175 Moreover, the failure of effective 
federal oversight has meant a greater burden on state and local 
officials, who often do not have the expertise necessary to 
compare and assess the quality of voting systems when making 
purchasing decisions.176 Some with the means and will, such as 
Los Angeles, with its $300 million Voting Solutions for All 
People program, have taken it upon themselves to make major 
investments in new technology and practices, but these are 
outliers.177 Furthermore, many state and local governments 
remain insufficiently trained to respond to cybersecurity 
threats178 and still more jurisdictions are using voter databases 
that are over a decade old—a lifetime in tech terms.179 The 
continued weakness of the U.S. response leaves election security 
a “significant counterintelligence threat,”180 which adversaries 
may continue to exploit, along with abusing social media firms 
with lax policies to combat digital repression.181   
The United States is not alone in facing these 
vulnerabilities, though. Both advanced and emerging 
democracies around the world are similarly grappling with how 
 
 175. See Newman III, supra note 171 (detailing the “nation’s vulnerable 
election infrastructure”). 
 176. See Newman II, supra note 152 (“[W]e’re still using antiquated 
equipment that should be replaced, both for security and reliability 
reasons . . . [which] is one reason why Congress and the states need to step up 
on election security spending.” (quoting the deputy director of Brennan 
Center’s Democracy Program)).  
 177. See Matt Stiles, Sweeping Change Is Coming for L.A. County Voters. 
If Things Go Wrong, He’ll Get the Blame, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/27GC-NK42 (PDF) (stating that major investments into 
better election technology is rare). 
 178. See Elizabeth Warren, My Plan to Strengthen Our Democracy, 
MEDIUM (June 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/WK9T-PDQ7 (noting that a number 
of states do not train election officials to deal with cyber security threats).  
 179. See id. (“Forty-two states use voter registration databases that are 
more than a decade old.”).  
 180. Julian E. Barnes & Adam Goldman, F.B.I. Warns of Russian 
Interference in 2020 Race and Boosts Counterintelligence Operations, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/AXD3-TRDN (quoting FBI Director 
Christopher Wray). 
 181. See id. (citing weak social media policies as a contributor to mass 
misinformation).  
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best to enhance the security and integrity of their own elections 
and democratic societies. Part IV focuses on some of these 
efforts, notably from the European Union, Asia, Australia, and 
Oceania. Implications for policymakers stemming from this 
analysis are explored in Part V. 
IV.  Lessons from Other Democracies 
Aside from the United States, other advanced and emerging 
democracies around the world are working to manage threats to 
their own election security, as well as creating strategies to 
manage digital repression and disinformation. These efforts 
form only one component of a larger debate happening around 
enhancing cybersecurity, which in turn suffers from a lack of 
clear definition. According to former General Michael Hayden, 
for example, “rarely has something been so important and so 
talked about with less clarity and less apparent understanding 
[than cybersecurity].”182 This Part surveys some of these efforts 
to help provide a framework for discussion in Part V, which in 
turn considers a range of potential reforms to help make 
democracy harder to hack.  
A.  European Union 
This section begins by discussing EU protections for voting 
infrastructure. We next move on to analyze companion efforts 
from civil society, and the private sector. 
 
 182. Michael V. Hayden, The Future of Things Cyber, 5 STRATEGIC STUD. 
Q. 3, 3 (2011); see Karen O’Donoghue, Some Perspectives on Cybersecurity, 
INTERNET SOC’Y (Nov. 12, 2012), https://perma.cc/49V2-L5SW (noting that the 
Internet Society maintains that “as a catchword, cybersecurity is frighteningly 
inexact and can stand for an almost endless list of different security concerns, 
technical challenges, and ‘solutions’ ranging from the technical to the 
legislative”).  
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1.  EU Efforts to Safeguard its Election Infrastructure 
Europeans went to the polls in 2019 for the first time in five 
years for widely anticipated elections.183 Cybersecurity was a 
key concern going into the summer after a series of high-profile 
breaches and disinformation campaigns.184 For example, 
electoral websites in the Netherlands were targeted by 
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in 2017,185 as was the elections 
oversight body in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic.186 Evidence 
is mounting as well of manipulation of the 2016 Brexit debate 
through the use of Facebook data.187 As revealed by 
whistleblower Christopher Wylie at a hearing in the European 
Parliament, it is “almost certain that systematic fraud and voter 
deception took place . . . [and that] Facebook’s system allowed it 
to happen.”188 Other recent examples include the release of 
thousands of internal documents of then French presidential 
candidate Emmanuel Macron prior to his 2017 election 
victory.189 However, unlike the DNC hack of 2016, this breach 
did not have a major impact on the French elections given that: 
(1) French media were prohibited from reporting on the breach 
within forty-four hours of the election; (2) the lack of a “thriving 
tabloid culture” in France as in the UK, or the equivalent of a 
Fox News Network; and (3) the actions of the Macron campaign 
 
 183. See John Borland, As Europe Went to the Polls, Cyber Election Efforts 
Paid Off, SYMANTEC (June 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/96WB-8NME (stating 
that the election hacks of 2016 contributed to the anticipation of the election 
cycle).  
 184. See id. (noting that Europe had a prodigious focus on cybersecurity 
during the election cycle).  
 185. See id.  
 186. See id. 
 187. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, New Evidence Emerges of Steve Bannon and 
Cambridge Analytica’s Role in Brexit, NEW YORKER (Nov. 17, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/NM8N-Y6RA (citing evidence of Facebook data being used to 
interfere with Brexit debate).  
 188. Freund, supra note 149. 
 189. See Andy Greenberg, Hackers Hit Macron with Huge Email Leak 
Ahead of French Election, WIRED (May 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/9UGY-97K7 
(describing the “data dump” that occurred less than forty hours before France’s 
election).  
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in releasing faked documents to mislead the attackers.190 There 
have also been spear phishing campaigns aimed at “German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union” 
party,191 along with successful cyber-attacks on the German 
parliament (Bundestag),192 and its federal data network.193 In 
those attacks, the hackers had worked their way so deep into 
the system that the entire Bundestag IT architecture had to be 
rebuilt.194 The breadth of these attacks remind us that a 
multifaceted approach is essential to the issues associated with 
influence, repression, and manipulation.  
To its credit, the European Union has taken a more 
proactive approach to managing the full range of cyber-enabled 
threats facing the integrity of its democratic systems including 
both election security and disinformation than the United 
States has managed to date. First, most EU nations have 
minimized the use of technology in elections, with the 
Netherlands rejecting the use of electronic voting machines 
(EVMs) entirely,195 France backing away from the use of online 
voting after 2016,196 and Germany stopping the use of EVMs due 
to a court order in 2005,197 just to name a few national actions. 
Among the more important of these is the Network Information 
Security (NIS) Directive, which was adopted by the European 
 
 190. See Rachel Donadio, Why the Macron Hacking Attack Landed with a 
Thud in France, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/425H-VQXE 
(explaining the “bereft coverage” of the hack). 
 191. Borland, supra note 183.  
 192. See Hack on German Government Network ‘Ongoing,’ DEUTSCHE 
WELLE (Jan. 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/AD9S-PNPK (discussing the hack on 
the German Parliament and the controversy surrounding the German 
government’s response).  
 193. See id. (reporting the cyber-attack on Germany’s main network).  
 194. See id. (“[S]ecurity officials were taken aback by the sophistication of 
the attack, which had exceeded levels of complexity previously seen.”).  
 195. See Borland, supra note 183 (“The Netherlands rejected the use of 
electronic voting machines in the 2000s, after studies showed they were 
susceptible to fraud.”). 
 196. See id.  
 197. See The Constitutionality of Electronic Voting in Germany, NDI, 
https://perma.cc/X5W3-7CG2 (“The German Constitutional Court upheld the 
first argument . . . that the use of [electronic] voting machines was 
unconstitutional.”). 
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Parliament in 2016 and was the first comprehensive piece of EU 
wide cybersecurity legislation.198  
The NIS Directive requires that EU Member States work in 
cooperation199 to improve cybersecurity risk management.200 
Unlike other attempts to combat cyber related issues, the NIS 
Directive expects nations to exchange information through 
Cooperation Groups, which may be considered a form of 
international ISAC.201 Of particular note to the readers, the 
2018 Compendium on Cyber Security of Election Technology 
summarized a wide array of election security best practices, 
including: “[A]nti-DoS protections, access control and 
authentication procedures for election IT systems, digital 
signatures and duplicate data-entry practices to ensure data 
integrity, network flow analysis and logging procedures, and 
network segmentation.”202  
Despite the progress, it is important to note the 
Compendium takes a balanced, realistic approach to embracing 
cybersecurity. As pointed out by the report, despite the 
 
 198. See Council Directive 2016/1148, 2016 O.J. (L 194) 1.  
 199. See id. at 1–2 (“A Cooperation Group, composed of representatives of 
Member States, the Commission, and the European Union Agency for 
Network and Information Security (‘ENISA’), should be established to support 
and facilitate strategic cooperation between the Member States regarding the 
security of network and information systems.”).  
 200. See A Cyber Security Framework for Europe, CORDIS, 
https://perma.cc/3UZY-WNJ5 (last updated Aug. 5, 2014) (discussing the EU’s 
plan to enhance cybersecurity).  
 201. See Council Directive 2016/1148, supra note 198, at 11 (creating 
Cooperation Groups to facilitate cooperation and the exchange of information). 
 202. Borland, supra note 183. The EU’s groundbreaking General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) is also a relevant and useful regime to better 
protect personal data, including with regards to political preferences. This is 
an expansive regulatory regime with a wide array of requirements on covered 
firms ranging from ensuring data portability and consent to mandating that 
firms disclose a data breach within seventy-two hours of becoming aware of 
the incident and then conducting a postmortem to ensure that a similar 
scenario will not recur. See Top 10 Operational Responses to the GDPR, INT’L 
ASS’N PRIV. PRO., https://perma.cc/Y3MM-LMH7 (providing access to different 
commentary related to the GDPR). However, some nations have been 
criticized by the likes of Privacy International for creating exceptions to GDPR 
safeguards for political parties. See Ailidh Callander, GDPR Loopholes 
Facilitate Data Exploitation by Political Parties, GDPR TODAY (Mar. 25, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/ECG4-SAMV.  
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widespread use of analogue practices and paper ballots, cyber 
threats are not eliminated given that these same jurisdictions 
may still “rely on electronic solutions for voter and candidate 
registration, vote counting or the communication of the results” 
that could be susceptible to cyber-attacks, along with the myriad 
other risks shown in Table 1.203 As such, the EU also embraces 
the use of risk-limiting audits that both monitor and ensure 
robust election security; however, these remain to be widely 
implemented across the EU.204  
2.  EU Efforts to Combat Digital Repression 
As highlighted in Part II, faith in the democratic process 
also demands a firm commitment to combatting digital 
repression, including the need to manage disinformation. For 
example, in 2018, then President of the European Commission 
Jean-Claude Juncker said: “We must protect our free and fair 
elections.”205 As such, the EU Commission proposed new rules 
building from the work of the Compendium to “better protect 
our democratic processes from manipulation by third countries 
or private interests.”206 In particular, in 2018 the European 
Commission pushed Facebook, Google, and Twitter to sign the 
“Code of Practice on Disinformation,”207 committing them to 
boost “transparency around political and issue-based 
advertising.”208  
This initiative was groundbreaking since the technology 
industry agreed “to self-regulatory standards to fight 
 
 203. COMPENDIUM, supra note 33, at 9. 
 204. See id. at 25 (“Testing and auditing are the cornerstones of network 
and information system security, as they are the only methods of gaining a 
practical assurance of functionality and security. Therefore, testing and 
auditing need to take a comprehensive and multifaceted approach.”). 
 205. European Commission Press Release IP/18/5681, State of the Union 
2018: European Commission Proposes Measures for Securing Free and Fair 
European Elections (Sept. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/4RF2-7P7P.  
 206. Id. 
 207. European Union, Code of Practice on Disinformation (2018) 
https://perma.cc/9C26-HL67 (PDF) [hereinafter Code on Disinformation].  
 208. Id.; see Borland, supra note 183 (noting that Microsoft has also 
expressed its desire to join the Code). 
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disinformation.”209 Among other provisions, the Code requires 
signatories to cull fake accounts, create safeguards against 
misrepresentation, and the misuse of automated bots, along 
with empowering consumers and the broader research 
community.210 In response, these firms have set up “searchable 
political-ad databases” and have begun to take down 
“disruptive, misleading or false” information from their 
platforms, and to reject ads that are inconsistent with election 
integrity policies.211 In 2019, Twitter rolled out a reporting 
feature in which individuals can report a tweet with misleading 
information by clicking on a drop down menu, select “It’s 
misleading about voting,” choose an option that explains how 
the tweet is misleading, and submit the report to Twitter.212 
Unfortunately, this did not seem to have the impact desired, as 
several organizations reported EU election hashtags, such as 
#EUElections2019, still “received a high level of suspiciously 
inorganic engagement.”213 Similarly, an activist group called 
Avaaz found that, despite these efforts, that there were more 
than “500 far-right and anti-EU Facebook pages and groups” 
being followed by some thirty-two million people.214 
In a similar regulatory vein, the Commission underscored 
the need for greater transparency in online political 
advertisements and targeting.215 It also sought further 
regulation of online advertising campaigns such as by 
“disclosing which party or political support group is behind 
online political advertisements as well as by publishing 
information on targeting criteria used to disseminate 
information to citizens,”216 and even called for national 
 
 209. Code on Disinformation, supra note 207. 
 210. See id. (listing requirements to protect against disinformation).  
 211. Id. 
 212. See Foo Yun Chee, Twitter Unveils New Tool Against EU Elections 
Meddlers, REUTERS (Apr. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/L3WS-4MJX (explaining 
the new reporting feature). 
 213. Kevin Townsend, Research Shows Twitter Manipulation in Weeks 
Before EU Elections, SEC. WEEK (May 28, 2019), https://perma.cc/Q37M-CR8B. 
 214. Borland, supra note 183. 
 215. See Townsend, supra note 213 (discussing the “large scale political 
social engineering through social media”). 
 216. European Commission Press Release IP/18/5681, supra note 205. 
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sanctions for the failure to comply with the  new disclosure 
requirements.217 And, to address potential difficulties arising 
from cyberinfrastructure issues in elections, the Commissions 
called for the  creation of a Network of Cybersecurity 
Competence Centers, in cooperation amongst the EU Member 
States, to better target and coordinate available funding for 
cybersecurity cooperation, research and innovation.218 
In a more widespread regulatory initiative, in June of 2019, 
the European Commission produced a report on the 
implementation of the Action Plan Against Disinformation 
(“Report”).219 The Action Plan proposes a set of actions that 
should further enable a joint and coordinated EU approach to 
addressing disinformation. The Action Plan focuses on four 
pillars: 
(1) Improving the capabilities of the Union’s institutions to 
detect, analyze, and expose disinformation;  
(2) Strengthening coordinated and joint responses by EU 
institutions and Member States to disinformation;  
(3) Mobilizing the private sector to tackle disinformation; 
and  
(4) Raising awareness about disinformation and improving 
societal resilience.220 
Within these pillars are previously unexplored areas of 
enhancements, which are not often considered within the 
 
 217. See id. (noting that the sanctions would be imposed for the illegal use 
of personal data to influence the outcome of European elections). 
 218. See Commission Proposal for a European Cybersecurity Competence 
Network and Centre, COM (2018) 630 final (Sept. 19, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/T2YS-CYKR (PDF) (“[T]he initiative will help to create an 
inter-connected, Europe-wide cybersecurity industrial and research 
ecosystem.”). 
 219. See generally Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions Concerning the Tackling of Online 
Disinformation, COM (2018) 236 final (Apr. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/C847-
EPFX (PDF) [hereinafter Tackling Disinformation]. 
 220. See Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions Action Plan against Disinformation, at 5, COM 
(2018) 36 final (May 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/R8TE-L5CP (PDF) (stating the 
four pillars).  
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context of cybersecurity. For example, in the area of 
communications, the European Commission declared the 
importance of supporting quality journalism as an essential 
element of a democratic society and “[c]ountering internal and 
external disinformation threats through strategic 
communication” while safeguarding the diversity and 
sustainability of the European news media ecosystem.221  
The Action Plan encourages a “more transparent, 
trustworthy and accountable online ecosystem” while “fostering 
education and media literacy” to secure resilient election 
processes.222 Key to this plan is the improvement of societal 
resilience in Europe and beyond to foster critical thinking and 
media-literate citizens.223 This requires focus to be placed on 
improving the detection, analysis, and exposure of 
disinformation by investing in digital tools, data analysis skills, 
and specialized staff as well as strengthening efforts to assess 
the reach and impact of disinformation.224 To accomplish such a 
lofty goal across the European Union, the Members will 
necessarily need to strengthen their cooperation and joint 
responses to disinformation as described above.225  
One such attempt at coordination exists in the EU’s Rapid 
Alert System.226 The system is designed to provide warnings on 
 
 221. See Tackling Disinformation, supra note 219, at 15. Building a more 
knowledgeable, media-savvy user, though, is no simple matter. Trust in media 
outlets takes time to build. We attach a given level of trust to an outlet based 
on our view of the institution, the organization, and our prior experience with 
the individual reporter. Yet, in the digital world, journalists proliferate, and 
no system of verifiable trustworthiness yet exists.  
 222. Id. at 12. 
 223. See id. (“The life-long development of critical and digital competences, 
in particular for young people, is crucial to reinforce the resilience of our 
societies to disinformation.”). 
 224. See id. at 9 (noting that “[a]n effective response [to disinformation] 
requires a solid body of facts and evidence on the spread of disinformation and 
its impact” and advocating for “[a]dditional data gathering and analysis by 
fact-checkers and academic researchers”). 
 225. See supra notes 183–204 and accompanying text. 
 226. See European Commission Memo/18/6648, Questions and 
Answers— The EU Steps Up Action Against Disinformation (Dec. 5, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/596S-YW36 (PDF) (rationalizing the planned system by 
noting that “[a] strong European response requires Member States and EU 
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disinformation campaigns in real-time and national contact 
points for disinformation in the Member States.227 It is designed 
to share real-time warnings, react and ensure coordination 
between EU capitals and Brussels, and has been active since 
March 2019.228 A joint EU sanctions regime goes along with the 
early-warning system to better deter adversarial nations such 
as Russia from interfering with European Parliament 
elections,229 though the effectiveness of this approach has been 
called into question.230 In short, criticism has arisen that “[i]t’s 
not rapid. There are no alerts. And there’s no system.”231 Core 
issues—such as the level at which an alarm should be sounded 
and how to incentivize robust, real-time information 
sharing— remain to be resolved.232  
 
institutions to work together much more closely, and to help each other 
understand and confront the threat”). 
 227. See id. (outlining the system’s goals and defining disinformation as 
“verifiably false or misleading information that is created, presented and 
disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public—distorts 
public debate, undermines citizens’ trust in institutions and media, and even 
destabilises democratic processes such as elections”). 
 228. See Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan Against 
Disinformation, at 2–3, JOIN (2019) 12 final (June 14, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/7UYU-PRS8 (PDF). 
 229. See id. at 8 (describing the recent adoption of legal measures 
providing for sanctions to deter and respond to cyber-attacks).  
 230. See Matt Apuzzo, Europe Built a System to Fight Russian Meddling. 
It’s Struggling., N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/G5UR-TDVA 
(highlighting disagreement over the success of the Rapid Alert System and 
noting critiques that the system is hampered by internal politics and 
incomplete, disorganized data collection). 
 231. Id. 
 232. See id. (noting that disagreement over when to sound an alarm has 
led to no alerts being issued and that only one-third of European nations 
contributed information to the system before the 2019 European Parliament 
elections). Further, and ahead of the European Parliament elections, in April 
2019 ENISA hosted a “war game” that was focused on identifying governance 
gaps and deepening ties to aid in regional election security efforts. Such efforts 
can help train election officials across the EU, though much more remains to 
be done help get local staffers up to speed, which is a similar issue facing many 
campaigns and election boards in the United States. That is why the Harvard 
Kennedy School’s Belfer Center on Science and International Affairs, for 
example, has focused on training these officials on the basics of cyber hygiene 
and election security best practices. For further discussion of the Belfer 
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At its most basic, the Report fails to “cover the issue of 
domestic or non-state actors in any substantive way or provide 
any real solutions.”233 Yet it is overly simplistic to believe all 
misinformation is produced from foreign actors, as was 
discussed in Part II. The Report’s failure to appreciate the 
nature and varied sources of potential actors is a significant 
limitation.234 Moreover, there has been little to suggest that the 
reporting to date has been as robust or useful as originally 
hoped.235 Nonetheless, the report and various initiatives are 
noteworthy first steps to improve the EU’s election 
cybersecurity, steps that other nations are watching closely.  
B.  Illustrative Examples: Australia, Oceania, and Asia 
This section builds from the comparative transatlantic case 
study outlined above with illustrative examples from how other 
advanced and emerging democracies are both protecting their 
election infrastructure and working to fend off digital 
repression. We begin by examining Australia, before moving on 
to several examples from Oceania and Asia before summarizing 
our key findings and moving on to policy implications.  
 
Center’s work in this area, see BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L AFFS., HARVARD 
KENNEDY SCH., THE STATE AND LOCAL ELECTION CYBERSECURITY PLAYBOOK 
(2018), https://perma.cc/7SK2-SYLP (PDF). 
 233. Jakub Kalenský, Evaluation of the EU Elections: Many Gaps Still 
Remain, DISINFO PORTAL (June 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/3TGJ-2LFC (last 
updated Sept. 3, 2019).  
 234. See id. (“If we do not know how many channels hostile actors control, 
how many messages they spread, and how many people they manage to 
persuade, how can we talk about proportional defense?”).  
 235. See id. (stating that in private conversations EU Member State 
representatives report that “many countries apparently still lack their own 
monitoring systems for the disinformation ecosystem, and . . . the RAS is 
barely used”); James Pamment, The EU’s Role in Fighting Disinformation: 
Taking Back the Initiative, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (July 15, 
2020), https://perma.cc/EFF6-UXM8 (arguing that the EU’s current 
disinformation policy is “characterized by . . . a weak evidence base” and that 
“a lack of trust between member states has led to low levels of information 
sharing and engagement”). 
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1.  Australia 
Australia, like EU Member States, the U.S., and other 
democracies throughout Oceania, is no stranger to 
disinformation campaigns and other attempts to subvert its 
democratic institutions.236 The threats to Australian democracy 
do differ in several notable ways, though, from the nation’s other 
Western peers.237 For example, voting is mandatory in 
Australia,238 and the major parties in Australia must agree on 
boundary lines.239 This thereby reduces some of the common 
issues that can arise in the context of broader U.S. democracy 
preservation conversations.240 The process of voting is also 
distinct from its American and even some European 
counterparts.241 For example, all Australians vote on paper, 
their votes are tallied by hand, and a robust Electoral 
Commission oversees the process to check for irregularities.242 
 
 236. See Stephanie Borys, China’s ‘Brazen’ and ‘Aggressive’ Political 
Interference Outlined in Top-Secret Report, ABC NEWS (May 29, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/7URJ-E6MU (last updated May 29, 2018) (describing the 
release of an intelligence report from the Australian government concluding 
that the Chinese government had attempted to infiltrate all levels of the 
Australian government for years). 
 237. See Scott J. Shackelford & Matthew Sussex, How Australia Can Help 
the US Make Democracy Harder to Hack, CONVERSATION (Sept. 27, 2018, 6:35 
AM), https://perma.cc/E289-3B5X (observing that threats to Australia’s voting 
system may largely relate to the government’s centralization of the system, 
while threats to voting in the U.S. are tied to the privatization and 
decentralization of voting). 
 238. See id. (discussing Australia’s voting system). 
 239. See id. (stating that the major parties agree on electoral boundaries 
to prevent gerrymandering); Rodney Smith, Chapter 8: Drawing Electoral 
Boundaries, ST. LIBR. N.S.W., https://perma.cc/S65W-WLCR (last updated 
Apr. 2019) (explaining how Australia draws its electoral boundaries). 
 240. See Shackelford & Sussex, supra note 237 (arguing that Australia’s 
mandatory voting law means that “there aren’t thorny political battles over 
who is allowed to vote,” and that party agreement on electoral boundaries 
prevents gerrymandering); Smith, supra note 239 (observing that the 
involvement of state legislatures in drawing electoral boundaries in the U.S. 
“means that American redistribution processes are much more involved with 
party politics than they are in Australia”).  
 241. See Shackelford & Sussex, supra note 237.  
 242. See id.; Counting the Votes, AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMM’N, 
https://perma.cc/8HBG-AMNB (last updated Dec. 3, 2019) (outlining the 
Australian ballot tabulation process). 
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Australia has also taken the affirmative step of designating its 
political parties as critical infrastructure, similar to the U.K.’s 
approach,243 along with investing in efforts to guard Australians 
against information warfare using micro-targeting.244 The U.S., 
on the other hand, continues to rely on outdated technologies 
and systems despite years of warnings, as was discussed in Part 
III. Yet even these safeguards cannot inoculate Australia, the 
U.S., or any nation against the full range of attacks designed to 
influence public opinion, interfere with politicians, and the 
media.245 For example, in February 2019, despite these efforts, 
the Australian Parliament was breached by a state-sponsored 
cyber-attack allegedly from China.246  
Australia has no rapid-alert system or code of conduct of the 
kind being tried in the EU to better manage the spread of 
disinformation.247 It did, however, sign both the Paris and 
Christchurch Calls, which are discussed further below, further 
 
 243. See Press Release, Scott Morrison, Prime Minister of Austl., 
Statement to the House of Representatives on Cyber Security (Feb. 18, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/5LE8-CPAB (declaring that “Australia’s democratic process 
is . . . our most critical piece of national infrastructure” and announcing that 
the Australian Cyber Security Centre was ready to provide immediate support 
to any political party). 
 244. See Shackelford & Sussex, supra note 237 (“Australia has decided to 
invest early to guard against future information warfare, such as 
micro-targeting audiences with tailor-made messaging and machine 
learning-enhanced deepfake videos.”).  
 245. See, e.g., Aaron Patrick, Sam Dastyari is a Chinese ‘Agent of 
Influence’: Ex-Intelligence Chief, FIN. REV. (Dec. 3, 2017, 11:00 PM), 
https://perma.cc/ETE6-5WCV (last updated Dec. 4, 2017) (“A top former 
intelligence official believes there is evidence that Labor senator Sam Dastyari 
was deliberately targeted by the China government to advance its interests in 
Australia.”). 
 246. See China Rejects Australian Parliament Cyber Attack Claims as 
‘Baseless’ and ‘Irresponsible,’ ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 18, 2019, 3:39 PM), 
https://perma.cc/ML5T-PC95 (reporting that Australian cyber experts were 
investigating a sophisticated cyber-attack on the “Liberal, Labor and National 
party platforms . . . [that occurred] during a breach of the Australian 
Parliament House network”). 
 247. See Daniel Funke & Daniela Flamini, A Guide to Anti-Misinformation 
Actions Around the World, POYNTER INST., https://perma.cc/2MPG-DWP9 (last 
updated Aug. 13, 2020) (describing the Australian government’s work to stop 
misinformation, including the establishment of a government task force and 
implementation of a media literacy campaign). 
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isolating the United States as the only member of the Five Eyes 
intelligence sharing partners to stay out of these agreements.248  
2.  Oceania 
Examining the regional context surrounding Australia is a 
useful exercise to better understand the unique approaches 
being taken by developing nations in response to the cyber 
threats they face.249 Given the lack of attention in the area 
relative to other more often studied cyber powers, such a study 
is vital to help build resilience, and trust, in democratic systems 
of strategic significance in the South Pacific.250 
As for election infrastructure, Pacific island nations’ 
election infrastructure and security efforts across Oceania range 
from quite sophisticated to relatively immature. New Zealand, 
for example, has a fairly robust, formal election 
infrastructure,251 while in others—such as the Federated State 
 
 248. See World Leaders and Tech Giants Sign Ardern’s ‘Christchurch Call’ 
to Curb Online Extremism, SBS NEWS (May 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/G433-
QEUS (describing the Christchurch Call’s goal of engaging major tech 
companies in the effort to “stamp[] out violent extremist content on the 
internet” and highlighting that the U.S. was not among the eighteen 
government signatories); The Supporters, PARIS CALL, https://perma.cc/R6NJ-
HYCU (listing signatories to the Paris Call for Trust and Security in 
Cyberspace); Our Values: Collaboration, OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., 
https://perma.cc/JF8T-ET53 (explaining that the “Five Eyes” group is a 
“long-lasting intelligence collaboration” between the U.S., United Kingdom, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand that developed after World War II). 
 249. See, e.g., David Shullman, Protect the Party: China’s Growing 
Influence in the Developing World, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 22, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/W7KN-QDYU (noting that China continues to grow its 
influence among Indo-Pacific countries, partly by manipulating the 
information space in the region).  
 250. This case study stems from the work of talented graduate students 
who worked together under the supervision of Professor Shackelford on a 
capstone team investigating election security in Spring 2019. These students 
include: Coryn Blacketer, Will Bobe, Bill Boger, Colin Darnell, Caellaigh 
Klemz, Janaki Reddy Gaddam, Kayla Hill, Tony Kelly, Jonathan Schubauer, 
and Aaron West. Jonathan Schubauer took the lead in summarizing their 
work for this Article.  
 251. See ONLINE VOTING WORKING PARTY, ONLINE VOTING IN NEW ZEALAND: 
FEASIBILITY AND OPTIONS FOR LOCAL ELECTIONS 12–16 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/925F-Z5F7 (PDF) (providing an overview of New Zealand’s 
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of Micronesia, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu—there is little 
election infrastructure to monitor.252 Yet many of the nations 
comprising Oceania do rely on paper ballot voting systems 
similar to the EU, are geographically isolated, and with the 
exception of New Zealand, have relatively small populations 
with historical connections to well-established 
democracies— namely the British Commonwealth, and the 
United States.253  
The Russian hacking efforts during the 2016 U.S. 
presidential campaign were direct and intensive.254 In contrast, 
Chinese efforts in Australia and throughout Oceania have been 
more indirect.255 Although China denies this, it is asserting 
itself militarily and economically throughout Oceania in an 
attempt to challenge the global reach and power of the United 
States, particularly in the Pacific.256 In fact, there is little 
evidence of extensive hacking, instead China has sought to 
influence policy through economic assistance and political 
contributions to candidates and parties,257 a strategy which 
these nations have yet to effectively defend against in an 
 
voting systems and infrastructure); see also Dylan Matthews, 3 Reasons Why 
New Zealand Has the Best-Designed Government in the World, VOX, 
https://perma.cc/6J5W-GC5E (last updated Jan. 16, 2015) (explaining New 
Zealand’s mixed-member proportional representation electoral system and 
unicameral legislative structure).  
 252. See IND. UNIV. & AUSTL. NAT’L UNIV., MAKING DEMOCRACY HARDER TO 
HACK 76 (2019), https://perma.cc/E3WH-MMYM (PDF) (summarizing findings 
from case studies of election security efforts and election infrastructure in 
Pacific Island nations). 
 253. See Stewart Firth, Instability in the Pacific: A Status Report, LOWY 
INST. (June 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/E2TH-MH5S (outlining trends in 
demographics, urbanization, and democracy in the Pacific Islands). 
 254. See supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text. 
 255. See, e.g., Shullman, supra note 249 (discussing China’s efforts to 
increase its global influence by funding infrastructure projects and 
“manipulating the information space to [its] advantage” in low-income 
countries).  
 256. See NADÈGE ROLLAND, CHINA’S EURASIAN CENTURY? 93–120 (2017) 
(theorizing that China is using its Belt and Road Initiative to “increase its own 
regional influence” and thereby prevent the United States from increasing 
American influence in the region). 
 257. See Shullman, supra note 249 (arguing that China’s approach to 
developing nations is largely driven by a need to protect the integrity and 
reputation of the Chinese Communist Party).  
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integrated manner similar to the EU Code for Disinformation 
discussed above.258  
Despite the lack of a regional strategy, there are already 
several efforts underway in the South Pacific to buttress 
cyber-threat information sharing. For example, as part of 
Australia’s “International Cyber Engagement Strategy,” the 
Pacific Cyber Security Operational Network (PaCSON) was 
established in April 2018.259 PaCSON is intended to foster 
cooperation among South Pacific island nations by providing a 
mechanism to share cybersecurity threat information and 
defensive tools, techniques and ideas.260 At its core, PaCSON 
consists of a network of government-appointed cybersecurity 
incident response experts from Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, 
Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, 
Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tokelau, 
Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.261 However, there is no existing or 
planned formal or informal regional structure in the South 
Pacific dealing with the security of election infrastructure.262 
3.  Asia 
As with Oceania, democracies across Asia are also dealing 
with election insecurity and disinformation.263 While this 
Article does not seek to fully address the myriad of threats to 
election infrastructure across Asia, it is worth briefly noting 
three trends in managing the twin threats of election integrity 
 
 258. See supra notes 207–208 and accompanying text. 
 259. Pacific Cyber Security Operational Network (PaCSON), AUSTL. GOV’T 
DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFS. & TRADE, https://perma.cc/RNC2-PNDS. 
 260. See id. (“PaCSON enables cooperation and collaboration by 
empowering members to share cyber security threat information, tools, 
techniques and ideas between nations.”).   
 261. See id. (listing its members).  
 262. See IND. UNIV. & AUSTL. NAT’L UNIV., supra note 252, at 101 
(explaining existing regional efforts dealing with cyber security and 
recommending the adoption of a “cohesive Pacific regional cybersecurity 
group”). 
 263. See, e.g., Allie Funk, Asia’s Elections Are Plagued by Online 
Disinformation, FREEDOM HOUSE (May 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/GYD3-GHGZ 
(“Parties and candidates across the region have turned to content 
manipulation as a preferred campaign tactic.”). 
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and disinformation. First, unlike efforts in the U.S., EU, or 
Australia, Asian democracies have been willing to criminalize 
the spreading of misinformation. Malaysia, for example, has 
criminalized the sharing of misinformation.264 Myanmar and 
Thailand have leaned on law enforcement actions to reign in 
misinformation, which have been abused in some cases to 
silence critics of public corruption.265 
Second, there has been focused attention on this issue from 
the highest levels of national leadership. In Indonesia, for 
example, President Joko Widodo spearheaded the creation of 
the new National Cyber and Encryption Agency to combat 
disinformation in their elections.266 One example was in June 
2019, when a member of the Muslim Cyber Army was arrested 
in Java for posting misinformation to the effect that the 
Indonesian government was being controlled by China.267 
Third, it is apparent that more nations are using 
increasingly heavy-handed tactics to clamp down on internet 
freedoms in the name of fighting disinformation. The problem of 
disinformation in India, for example, is so severe that it has 
been likened to a public health crisis.268 One Microsoft study, for 
 
 264. See Funke & Flamini, supra note 28 (“The law makes publishing or 
sharing fake news punishable by up to six years in jail and a fine of 500,000 
ringgit ($128,000). It also makes online service providers more responsible for 
third-party content [and] affects foreign news outlets reporting on 
Malaysia . . . .”). 
 265. See id. (reporting that in 2018 Myanmar authorities jailed three 
journalists for publishing a story about the regional government and that since 
2018 Thai officials have increasingly targeted people who allegedly spread 
false information on social media); Tactics to Fight Disinformation in 
Thailand, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines and India, GLOB. GROUND MEDIA 
(Apr. 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/BG89-JPZ8 (noting fears that Thailand’s 
military junta would use combating misinformation on social media as a 
screen for increased censorship of political dissent).  
 266. See Funke & Flamini, supra note 28 (reporting that “the agency was 
hiring hundreds of people to ‘provide protection’ to institutions online,” 
although the specific parameters of its authority were “still unclear”).  
 267. See id. (noting that man was “charged with spreading fake news and 
hate speech”). 
 268. See Samir Patil, India Has a Public Health Crisis. It’s Called Fake 
News., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/CV4B-64FZ (arguing that 
India should implement citizen education campaigns modeled on successful 
public health campaigns in order to combat widespread disinformation). 
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example, found that 64 percent of Indians encountered 
disinformation online in 2019, which was the highest proportion 
among twenty-two surveyed countries.269 Not only have these 
incidents affected elections such as by spreading false 
information about candidates on WhatsApp,270 but they have led 
to real-world harms including at least thirty-three deaths and 
sixty-nine instances of mob violence.271 In response, the Indian 
government has shut down the internet more than one hundred 
times over the past year,272 and has proposed laws that would 
give it largely unchecked surveillance powers, mirroring 
Chinese-style internet censorship.273 
C.  Summary 
As is apparent from these case studies and illustrative 
examples, there is divergent state practice with regards to both 
the protection of election infrastructure and the use of digital 
repression. The area of greatest convergence seems to be the 
recognition that paper ballots, or at the least EVMs using paper 
trails, are vital to building confidence in the outcome of an 
election.274 Fewer jurisdictions that we could identify have 
 
 269. Microsoft Releases Digital Civility Index on Safer Internet Day, 
MICROSOFT (Feb. 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/QRD8-UJTS. 
 270. See Patil, supra note 268 (reporting that police linked a fake video 
that was shared on WhatsApp to the deaths of 62 people in sectarian violence 
and the displacement of 50,000 more six months before India’s general 
elections in 2014).  
 271. See Child-Lifting Rumours Caused 69 Mob Attacks, 33 Deaths in Last 
18 Months, BUS. STANDARD, https://perma.cc/89LK-TZ7P (last updated July 9, 
2018) (reporting that between January 2017 and July 2018 rumors of 
“child-lifting” spread on Indian social media led to dozens of mob attacks on 
suspected abductors and thirty-three deaths). 
 272. See Funke & Flamini, supra note 28. 
 273. See Vindu Goel, India Proposes Chinese-Style Internet Censorship, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/L48R-MPA8 (explaining that the 
proposed rules would allow officials to demand that social media sites remove 
particular categories of content, build automated screening tools to block 
“unlawful information,” and provide authorities with greater access to 
individual user accounts on messaging platforms). 
 274. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 150 (“The key insight behind auditing 
as a cyber defense is that if you have a paper record that the voter got to 
inspect, then that can’t later be changed by a cyber-attack.”). 
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taken the next step of requiring risk-limiting audits or have 
reclassified their election infrastructure or political parties as 
“critical.”275 These findings are summarized in Table 2 and are 
unpacked further in Part V. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Surveyed Nation-State Efforts to 
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 275. See infra Table 2.  
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V.  Implications for Policymakers 
Cyberspace has long bedeviled policymakers, practitioners, 
and even novelists alike. As the science fiction author William 
Gibson admitted when he used the word ‘cyberspace’ in his book 
Neuromancer: “All I knew about the word ‘cyberspace’ when I 
 
 276. See Post-Election Audits, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, (Oct. 25, 
2019), https://perma.cc/N38D-C63L (listing the only four states with a 
statutory requirement for risk-limiting audits). 
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coined it, was that it seemed like an effective buzzword. It 
seemed evocative and essentially meaningless. It was 
suggestive of something, but had no real semantic meaning, 
even for me, as I saw it emerge on the page.”277 As with 
cyberspace generally, and has been shown through this Article 
the number of threats facing democratic institutions—including 
with regards to election security and digital repression—is long, 
and seemingly only growing longer.278 Indeed, the likes of Henry 
Farrell and Bruce Schneier have argued that: “the open forms 
of input and exchange that it [democracy] relies on can be 
weaponized to inject falsehood and misinformation that erode 
democratic debate.”279 Opinions vary as to whether to consider 
democracy itself as a cyber threat vector, and how to mitigate 
the risks, such as by doubling down on democratic institutions 
or relying on other actors—including the private sector—to 
better manage these issues such as the spread of disinformation 
through the EU-organized Code discussed in Part IV. This Part 
proceeds by summarizing the policy suggestions made 
throughout using an analytical framework pioneered by Peter 
Swire, among others.280 
In 1948, George Kennan, an American diplomat and a 
historian, defined national security as “the continued ability of 
the country to pursue the development of its internal life 
without serious interference, or threat of interference, from 
foreign powers.”281 Yet such a conception of national security is 
not so clear cut when the goal is protecting democracy itself, as 
seen in cases of Russian operatives organizing U.S. citizens to 
 
 277. JARICE HANSON, THE SOCIAL MEDIA REVOLUTION 113 (2016). 
 278. See supra Part II. 
 279. Henry Farrell & Bruce Schneier, Democracy’s Dilemma, BOS. REV. 
(May 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/RF2K-XHLU. 
 280. See Peter Swire, A Pedagogic Cybersecurity Framework, 61 COMMC’NS 
ACM 23, 23–24 (2018) (proposing a multidisciplinary framework for teaching 
cybersecurity that “organizes the subjects that have not been included in 
traditional cybersecurity courses, but instead address cybersecurity 
management, policy, law, and international affairs”). 
 281. Gayle Smith, In Search of Sustainable Security, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS (June 19, 2008, 9:00 AM), https://perma.cc/7XEY-U2KW. 
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engage in activism during the 2016 election cycle.282 Neither is 
an analytical framework to ascertain all the necessary steps 
that must be taken to harden democratic institutions against 
these attacks. What follows is a suggested path forward. Before 
turning to the work of Swire, though, it is first necessary to 
provide some context. 
Numerous regulatory theorists and governance scholars 
have considered cyberspace, including the best ways to 
engender change in this dynamic, interconnected environment. 
Yochai Benkler, for example, has offered a three-layer structure 
to consider interventions, including: (1) the “physical 
infrastructure,” including the fiber-optic cables and routers 
making up the physical aspect of cyberspace; (2) the “logical 
infrastructure,” comprising necessary “software such as the 
TCP/IP protocol;” and (3) the “content layer,” which includes 
data and, indirectly, users.283 This conceptualization, while 
helpful, only takes us so far in better understanding the various 
cyber threats facing democratic institutions and what to do 
about them. It largely ignores, for example, the role played by 
state and non-state actors in shaping the content layer.284 
Lawrence Lessig built from this model,285 advocating for 
“decentralized innovation” making use of various modalities 
including interventions supporting layers.286 However, Andrew 
 
 282. See, e.g., Shaun Walker, Russian Troll Factory Paid US Activists to 
Help Fund Protests During Election, GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 2017, 12:13 PM), 
https://perma.cc/C8D4-N3EJ (reporting that Russian “trolls” offered $80,000 
to U.S. activists in order to support the organization of protests and events 
about divisive social issues). 
 283. Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper 
Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 
FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 561, 562 (2000). 
 284. See, e.g., Swire, supra note 280, at 24 (explaining that private 
organizations and national governments influence cybersecurity risks and 
responses by taking action to mitigate attacks, enacting and enforce laws, and 
engaging in dialogue or signing treaties with other nations). 
 285. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 
160 (2004) (describing “the interaction between architecture and law” in the 
context of copyright regulation). 
 286. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE 
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 85–86 (2001) (arguing that “commons” at 
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Murray has concluded that this is “idealistic” and that, “the 
harnessing of one regulatory modality through the application 
of another is more likely to lead to further regulatory 
competition, due to the complexity of the network 
environment.”287 Instead of solely relying on code, then, laws, 
norms, and markets also have important roles to play in shaping 
a polycentric response to addressing vulnerabilities in 
democratic election systems.288  
One way to think through such a polycentric approach is to 
make use of Swire’s stack analogy,289 offered in adapted form as 
Table 3. Under this formulation, the foregoing analysis was 
concerned with levels seven through ten, but the chart 
highlights the extent to which it is vital to secure the underlying 
system architecture including voting machines. 
 
Table 3: Applying Swire’s Expanded OSI Stack to 
Election Security290 
Layer Vulnerability Policy 
Response(s) 





and audits; require 
 
the code, content, and physical layers “create the opportunity for individuals 
to draw upon resources without connections, permission, or access granted by 
others”). 
 287. ANDREW D. MURRAY, THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE: CONTROL IN 
THE ONLINE ENVIRONMENT 46 (2007) (“It is highly unlikely that content 
producers, media corporations and other copyright holders will allow for a 
neutral system designed to protect cultural property and creativity at the cost 
of loss of control over their products.”). 
 288. See id. at 46–47, 124 (“[T]he effectiveness of code-based control 
mechanisms depends entirely upon their recognition and acceptance within 
these first-order regulatory environments [competition, society, and 
hierarchy].”). 
 289. See Swire, supra note 280, at 24 (explaining that Swire’s model adds 
three “layers” of cybersecurity vulnerabilities to the seven traditional layers 
of the Open Systems Interconnection model that computer scientists use to 
conceptualize computer systems). 
 290. Id. For a description of these cyber-attacks, see Chapter 3 in SCOTT J. 
SHACKELFORD, MANAGING CYBER ATTACKS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, BUSINESS, 
AND RELATIONS (2014). 
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As Table 3 shows, there is a great deal that both the public 
and private sectors can do, locally and globally, to make 
democracy harder to hack. Particularly on levels eight through 
ten of Swire’s Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) stack 
analogy, which is popular among programmers in illustrating 
the various levels of systems, there is a great deal more that the 
U.S. and other democracies can and should be doing to secure 
vulnerable election infrastructure and combat digital 
repression.  
In the United States, despite post-2016 funding, still more 
than two-thirds of U.S. counties report insufficient funding to 
replace outdated, vulnerable paperless voting machines, further 
help is needed.291 Aside from appropriating sufficient funds to 
replace outdated voting machines and tabulation systems, 
Congress also should encourage states to follow Colorado’s 
 
 291. See Lawrence Norden & Andrea Córdova McCadney, Voting 
Machines at Risk: Where We Stand Today, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Mar. 5, 
2019), https://perma.cc/99U9-PVKD. 
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example292 (and the best practices listed in the EU 
Compendium)293 by refusing to fund voting machines that use 
paperless ballots, and requiring risk-limiting audits, which use 
statistical samples of paper ballots to check if official election 
results are correct, to increase confidence in election outcomes. 
Congress should also require NIST to update their voting 
machine standards, which state and county election officials 
rely on in deciding which machines to purchase as in the case of 
Australia.294 Further, a National Cybersecurity Safety Board 
could also be created to investigate cyber-attacks on U.S. 
election infrastructure and issue reports after elections to help 
ensure that vulnerabilities do not go unaddressed.295 A crash 
course is also needed for local and county election officials across 
the nation.296 There is an opportunity for both civil society and 
higher education to aid in this effort, as Indiana University is 
doing to help the Secretary of State’s Office prepare for a wide 
array of scenarios, conduct tabletop exercises, and create a 
cybersecurity guidebook for use by newly elected and appointed 
 
 292. See Nathaniel Minor, Colorado Is a Pretty Darn Safe Place to Cast a 
Ballot. This Is How We Got Here, COLO. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 25, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/4X9P-4HDC (describing Colorado’s ballot-counting and 
risk-limiting audit systems and observing that the Washington Post called 
Colorado “the ‘safest’ place to cast a ballot” in the United States). 
 293. See generally COMPENDIUM, supra note 33 (listing the cyber security 
best practices). 
 294. See Eric Geller, New Federal Guidelines Could Ban Internet in Voting 
Machines, POLITICO (Oct. 30, 2019, 4:03 PM), https://perma.cc/U4K6-469Z 
(“[The Voluntary Voting System Guidelines]—produced by the Election 
Assistance Commission and the technical standards agency NIST—is not a set 
of mandatory federal rules. However, most states require voting equipment to 
pass VVSG-based testing before they buy it.”). 
 295. See Scott J. Shackelford & Austin E. Brady, Is It Time for a National 
Cybersecurity Safety Board? Examining the Policy Implications and Political 
Pushback, 28 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 56, 68 (2018) (“Such a model would be an 
improvement on the existing reliance on Cyber Emergency Response 
Teams . . . and aide in effective policymaking at both the state and federal 
level given the lack of hard, verifiable data on the scope and scale of 
cyber-attacks.”). 
 296. See, e.g., Indiana University to Help Secure Indiana’s 2020 Elections, 
IND. UNIV. (Oct. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/SV86-G6VP (noting that Indiana 
University will host “regional ‘boot camps’ with [Indiana] county clerk offices 
to train election officials about how to respond to different forms of 
cyberattacks, such as phishing, phone scams and impersonation calls”). 
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election officials.297 Other states could engage in similar 
partnerships, along with pooling resources to create repositories 
of best practices.  
Learning lessons from the case studies in Part IV, the U.S. 
government could build out the capability of DHS to ward off 
disinformation campaigns similar to Indonesia’s approach, as 
California is doing through its Secretary of State’s Office.298 
Ahead of the 2020 election cycle, the United States could also 
work with allies around the world to build from the Paris Call 
for Trust and Security in Cyberspace and the Christchurch Call 
with these specific actions, perhaps encapsulated in a Call to 
Safeguard Democracy.299 The UN Group of Government Experts 
and standing working group should be leveraged in this effort, 
and new regional cybersecurity hubs created to speed the 
transfer of information between jurisdictions as has already 
been accomplished through the EU’s Cooperation Groups.300 
One possibility is a regional approach, such as a “South Pacific 
Elections—Information and Analysis Center (SPE-ISAC),” a 
potential solution to the lack of a cohesive Pacific regional 
cybersecurity group.301  
Finally, with regards to disinformation in particular, the 
U.S. government could work with the EU to globalize the 
self-regulatory Code of Practice on Disinformation for social 
 
 297. See id. (“[S]tate legislators have awarded Indiana University 
$301,958 to partner with the Indiana Secretary of State’s Office to review and 
improve the state’s election cybersecurity incident response plan.”). 
 298. See Ben Adler, California Launches New Effort to Fight Election 
Disinformation, CAPRADIO (Sept. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/6YSA-FY2L 
(“Under a recently-passed law, the office will ‘monitor and counteract false or 
misleading information’ that could ‘suppress voter participation or cause 
confusion and disruption of the orderly and secure administration of 
elections.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
 299. See World Leaders and Tech Giants Sign Ardern’s ‘Christchurch Call’ 
to Curb Online Extremism, SBS NEWS (May 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/G433-
QEUS (explaining that the Christchurch Call is a pledge to eradicate “violent 
extremist content on the internet” signed by national governments and major 
technology companies). 
 300. See supra notes 199–202 and accompanying text. 
 301. See IND. UNIV. & AUSTL. NAT’L UNIV., supra note 252, at 101–05 
(proposing specific features of a potential SPE-ISAC, considering potential 
benefits of such an approach, and recommending next steps for its 
implementation).  
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media firms (thus avoiding thorny First Amendment 
concerns).302 It could also work to create new forums for 
international information sharing and more effective rapid alert 
and joint sanctions regimes.303 The international community 
has the tools to act and hold accountable those actors that would 
threaten democratic institutions. Failing the political will to act, 
pressure from consumer groups and civil society will continue to 
mount on tech firms, in particular Facebook, which may be 
sufficient for them to voluntarily expand their efforts in the EU 
globally, the same way that more firms are beginning to comply 
with GDPR globally as opposed to designing new information 
systems for each jurisdiction.304  
VI.  Conclusion 
No nation, however powerful, or tech firm, regardless of its 
ambitions, is able to safeguard democracies against the full 
range of threats they face in 2020 and beyond. Only a 
multifaceted, polycentric approach that makes necessary 
changes up and down the stack will be up to the task. By 
working together, we might even be able to prove John Adams 
wrong by showing that—despite the challenges—democratic 




 302. See supra notes 207–211 and accompanying text. 
 303. See supra notes 226–232 and accompanying text. 
 304. DIGITALEUROPE, ALMOST TWO YEARS OF GDPR: CELEBRATING AND 
IMPROVING THE APPLICATION OF EUROPE’S DATA PROTECTION FRAMEWORK 3 
(2020), https://perma.cc/72PY-TM5X (PDF) (“[T]he fact that the GDPR has 
inspired other data protection regimes around the world, at least regarding its 
principles, has led many organisations to address data protection not only for 
their EU operations but also globally . . . .”). 
 305. See Letter from John Adams to John Taylor, supra note 1 (“Remember 
Democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes[,] exhausts and murders itself. 
There never was a Democracy Yet, that did not commit suicide.”).  
